

Chapter 1

An Introduction to International Regulatory Cooperation in ASEAN and New Zealand

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CHAPTER 1

Interconnected Government: An Introduction to International Regulatory Cooperation in ASEAN and New Zealand

Derek Gill and Edo Setyadi

1. Introduction


Since 1960, there has been rapid growth in international cooperation with governments working more closely together. Growing interdependence reflects a range of factors. These include economic drivers, such as the growth of global supply chains driven by globalisation and the rise of multinational corporations, alongside pressures to reduce barriers to trade. There are also technological developments, such as digitisation and the emergence of the internet, as well as geopolitical imperatives, such as the development of regional trading blocs (e.g. the European Union [EU]).

This growth has led to the proposition that what is emerging in international relations is a new style of global governance, known as international regulatory cooperation (IRC) (see Slaughter, 2004). This involves judges and legislators as well as regulators working directly with their foreign counterparts through sector- or region-specific networks. Officials are engaging on a wide range of issues, from health services to environmental issues and finance, as they exchange information and share their experience in policies, law, and regulatory enforcement. These engagements take place through a bewilderingly wide array of channels. In addition to traditional formal governmental agreements ('intergovernmental'), IRC can include supranational agreements (e.g. the EU and other deep regional integration agreements), as well as regulator-to-regulator agreements ('transgovernmental'). However, these transgovernmental networks are not unique. IRC is merely a special case of a more general type of cross-governmental cooperation conducted at a range of levels of government: local, subnational, national, regional, and international.

What is striking about these transgovernmental network arrangements is that they are less visible and more under-the-radar than more traditional intergovernmental state-to-state relationships or supranational agreements, which are mediated through formal treaties, international organisations, and foreign affairs ministries. Anne-Marie Slaughter suggested that regulators are becoming the 'new diplomats', 'on the front lines of issues that were once the exclusive preserve of domestic policy, but that now cannot be resolved by national authorities alone' (Slaughter, 2004: 63).

Cooperation amongst regulators is longstanding as regulators have been working across jurisdictional boundaries for well over a century. The International Telecommunication Union, established as the International Telegraph Union in 1865, was formed just 21 years after Samuel Morse transmitted the first electronic message and before the first patents for telephones were filed. What is new is the extent and intensity of IRC. Figure 1.1 draws on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) dataset of regulator-to-regulator forums, which the OECD terms transgovernmental networks (TGN). The figure shows that, while IRC is not new, IRC networks have grown rapidly in recent decades.

Figure 1.1. New International Regulatory Cooperation Networks Established Each Decade



Source: Abbott, K., C. Kauffmann, and J.-R. Lee. (2018), 'The Contribution of Trans Governmental Networks of Regulators to International Regulatory Co-operation', Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Regulatory Policy Working Papers, No. 10, Paris: OECD; drawing on the OECD database of 144 regulator networks where the establishment date is known.

One factor leading to the growth of networks since the 1970s has been the formation of the EU, which resulted in a host of intra-EU arrangements. In response, non-EU countries such as the United States (US) and Canada developed IRC arrangements of their own so they could engage with their regulatory counterparts in the EU. However, the fastest growth came in the 1990s and 2000s, reflecting ongoing demand-pull pressure from globalisation and supply push from enhancements in information and communications technology.¹

The OECD database of 144 regulator networks (TGNs) consists of 57 multilateral and 87 regional TGNs. Europe dominates the regional networks with 40 bodies operating in the EU. 'Asia', 'Asian', or 'Asia-Pacific' appears in the name of just 10 regional networks. Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) describe the spectrum of IRC as 'frequent' amongst high-income countries, while south-to-south IRC is 'limited to date'.

Analysis of IRC amongst developed economies is still limited. However, a noteworthy article by Weiner and Alemanno (2015) provides case studies of IRC between the US and the EU, the US and Canada, and Australia and New Zealand. Less is known, however, about how IRC is working between developed and developing countries or amongst developing countries, with limited focus on Asia and the Pacific region as a whole. The form, nature, and scale of such cooperation is not well documented, and there is little publicly available information about how well different mechanisms are working in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or East Asian context. The research presented in this publication is designed to address that gap in understanding.

¹As the dataset used in Figure 1.1 does not cover the full decade since 2010, the number of new IRC networks established in the latest decade (26) is not strictly comparable with the level in the previous 2 decades.

2. Focus of the Study

The purpose of the ERIA study is to explore the extent and enablers of the development of IRC in the East Asian region. This chapter sets the scene for the research by defining what IRC is and why IRC is important in the context of the Asian Economic Community (AEC) 2025. It then outlines the research questions and the research approach. This provides the context for subsequent chapters, which present the findings of research on IRC in the East Asia region, offer some reflections on future directions of IRC, and conclude with practitioners' insights into the craft of IRC.

2.1. Defining International Regulatory Cooperation

The US Chamber of Commerce defines IRC as, '...any interaction between regulators from different countries that results in some form of cooperation, with the view towards increasing efficiency, while achieving the desired regulatory outcome' (US Chamber of Commerce, 2017: 2). The OECD (2013) defines IRC as, 'any agreement or organizational arrangement, formal or informal, between countries to promote some form of cooperation in the design, monitoring, enforcement, or ex post management of regulation'. While the definitions vary, the essence of IRC is the development of engagement, mutual understanding, and cooperation between national and international regulators.²

This definition begs the question as to what regulators and regulations actually are, something on which there is no scholarly agreement.³ Regulation, used here in the broad sense of the verb 'to regulate', means the use of legal instruments – primary laws, secondary rules, tertiary guidance, and codes – to give effect to a government policy intervention. As this research project focused on cooperation amongst central government regulators, international cooperation with subnational government bodies or private regulators such as self-regulators or private standard setters was out of scope. The title of the publication *Interconnected Government* reflects the recognition that national regulators simultaneously cooperate on multiple levels: with regulators in local, regional, and district governments; with other regulators in their own government; with their international counterparts; and with international organisations.

Table 1.1 uses the OECD's classification of IRC structures to illustrate examples of IRC by national regulators involving some or all ASEAN countries.

IRC is an integral part of good regulatory practice (GRP) because consideration needs to be given to issues of consistency with international norms and models. However, IRC is like art: people know it when they see it, but it is hard to define the boundaries. Because it is not bounded, measurement is not easy. While it is generally agreed that there is a spectrum from autonomous regulation at one end to full regulatory integration at the other, there is no agreed taxonomy or classification system in the literature for the intermediate points in between.

² Some jurisdictions, including Canada, the US, and Mexico, have a narrower conception of IRC based on the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, which aims to ensure that technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures are non-discriminatory and do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. In this volume we use IRC in a broader sense.

³ See the discussion in Victoria University of Wellington, Regulatory Reform Toolkit. <https://www.regulatorytoolkit.ac.nz/about-regulation/definitions>

Table 1.1. Examples of International Regulatory Cooperation Involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations


Type of mechanism	Illustrative examples
Harmonisation via supranational bodies	Basil Committee for Banking Supervision International Accounting Standards Board
Specific negotiated agreements (treaties and conventions)	ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
Regulatory partnership between countries	ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and Quality
Intergovernmental organisations	International Civil Aviation Organization
Regional agreements with regulatory provisions	ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement
MRAs	ASEAN MRAs for Professional Services
Transgovernmental networks	The Chiang Mai Initiative (Multilateralization)
Formal requirements to consider international regulatory cooperation when developing regulations	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
Recognition of international standards	The Philippines adopting ISO 9001 stand-ard and applying it to government offices and their systems
Soft law	ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025
Dialogue or informal exchange of in-formation	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Business Advisory Council

ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ISO = International Organization for Standardization, MRA = mutual recognition agreement.

Sources: Various including Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013), International Regulatory Co-operation: Addressing Global Challenges. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Publishing.

IRC comes in a variety of shapes and sizes, as shown in Figure 1.2. The typology in Figure 1.2 below shows how IRC can take many positions along a spectrum. At one end of the continuum is unilateral recognition through the adoption of another country’s regulatory settings or standards, and at the other harmonisation through convergence of policies and practices. Beyond harmonisation is full integration through common rules for joint institutions. In between are a range of intermediate points such as cooperation through communities of practice, dialogue and information sharing, explicit cooperation on policies and procedures, and coordination through mutual recognition agreements.

Figure 1.2. The International Regulatory Cooperation Continuum



Source: Gill D. (2018), based on the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment International Regulatory Cooperation Toolkit (forthcoming). Gill D. (2018), International Regulatory Cooperation Case Studies and Lessons Learnt. New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. Wellington: NZIER.

2.2. The Dimensions of International Regulatory Cooperation

There are multiple dimensions of IRC. When entering into IRC arrangements, countries need to make decisions at five levels: (i) why undertake IRC, (ii) whom to cooperate with, (iii) how intensively to cooperate, (iv) what to cooperate on, and (v) which structure to use. Thus, IRC can take a bewildering variety of forms, based on the following variables:


- (i) 'why' – the different imperatives for IRC (economic benefits, regulatory effectiveness, and geopolitical considerations);
- (ii) 'who' – the number of actors (arrangements can be bilateral, subregional/regional, plurilateral, or multilateral);
- (iii) 'how' – how intensive the cooperation is (e.g. networks of national regulators, mutual recognition agreements, and formal regulatory partnerships);
- (iv) 'what' – what areas the cooperation focuses on (regulatory policies [rule making], regulatory practices [interpreting, applying, and enforcing rules], or regulatory organisational management [supporting rules administration]; and
- (v) 'which' – the legal form or other mechanism adopted.

To illustrate the latter, some IRC is purely informal. For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is not a legal entity, but merely an agreement between the economies involved to participate. IRC can also operate under formal legal structures, such as regulatory provisions in free trade agreements, supranational arrangements (such as the EU), and agreements between regulators. For example, Petrie's 2014 examination of more than 100 IRC agreements on competition policy found that intergovernmental agreements (e.g. competition policy chapters in regional trade agreements) were the most common form, followed by transgovernmental agreements (e.g. regulator-to-regulator-only agreements), while supranational agreements (e.g. the EU) were relatively rare. The 'depth of cooperation', defined as the extent of constraint on the autonomy of states to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce rules, was greater under more formal supranational and intergovernmental agreements than under transgovernmental agreements

The OECD has developed a classification based on the structural mechanisms, as shown in Figure 1.3. The left side shows the ladder of mechanisms ranging from the most to the least formal, while the right side lists some IRC examples from the region. The authors have made an educated guess about the frequency of these arrangements, and provided some examples from the region.


The OECD schema highlights the distinction between formal agreements involving supranational and intergovernmental cooperation 'at the top'; and more informal, transgovernmental agency-to-agency cooperation arrangements (or networks) lower down. There is a plethora of informal networks in the region where regulators such as censorship authorities share experiences and develop common practices. By contrast, there are few examples of harmonisation through supranational bodies.

Figure 1.3. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's International Regulatory Cooperation Ladder



APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, CER-SEM = New Zealand-Australia Closer Economic Relations-Single Economic Market, IRC = international regulatory cooperation, JAS-ANZ = Joint Accreditation System of Australia and New Zealand, CPTTP = Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, TTMRA = Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act.
 Source. Gill, D. (2016), 'Asia and Europe Regulatory Connectivity and Coherence', in A. Prakash (ed.) Asia-Europe Connectivity Vision 2025: Challenges and Opportunities. Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia.

Figure 1.4. International Regulatory Cooperation Varies by Intensity and Focus



Source: Gill, D. (2018), 'International Regulatory Cooperation Case Studies and Lesson Learnt'. Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Economic Research; based on Petrie, M. (2009), 'Jurisdictional Integration: How Economic Globalisation Is Changing State Sovereignty', Victoria University <https://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10063/893> (accessed 17 April 2020) (Figure 3, p.75).

Alternative classifications have been devised based on the depth of cooperation: regulatory policies (making rules), regulatory enforcement practices (interpreting, applying, and enforcing rules), and other regulatory organisational management practices (supporting rules administration).⁴ Such a schema is shown in Figure 1.4.

Figure 1.4 builds on the continuum of the ways to cooperate (in Figure 1.2) and adds what the focus of IRC is. The vertical axis, like the horizontal one, is a continuum. The vertical axis highlights that the focus of IRC can be centred on different aspects: on regulatory policies (making rules), regulatory enforcement practices (interpreting, applying, and enforcing rules), or other regulatory organisational management practices (supporting rules administration). While the precise mix of regulatory functions undertaken varies across regulators, most carry out some of the following activities: setting standards; education and assistance; entry and exit control; checking compliance (inspecting, auditing, and monitoring); intelligence collection; enforcement (conducting operations, investigations, and sanctions); and dispute and crisis management. Organisational governance includes corporate support functions, like staff training, data sharing, knowledge management and record keeping, measurement, and research.⁵

⁴ Petrie (2014) defines 'depth of cooperation' in terms of the extent of constraint on the autonomy of states to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce rules. Depth of cooperation is measured for international competition policy based on an analysis of transgovernmental (e.g. regulator-to-regulator-only agreements), intergovernmental (e.g. competition policy chapters in free trade agreements), and supranational (e.g. the EU) agreements.

⁵ See Abbot, Kauffman, and Lee (2018: 16) for a more extended discussion of the range of governance and

2.3. International Regulatory Cooperation as a Part of the Regulatory Tool Kit

IRC is not a standalone practice but an integral part of other regulatory management techniques such as GRPs, regulatory management systems, and the reduction of unnecessary regulatory burdens. In a sense, IRC is an important part of the regulatory tool kit that ASEAN member state governments can use in the design and implementation of regulations. IRC supports work that will reduce 'regulatory distance' and promote greater regulatory coherence amongst ASEAN Member States. With respect to reducing unnecessary regulatory burdens, IRC can help ensure that regulations do not impose unwarranted or unnecessary compliance costs, distortions, or inconsistencies in the design and implementation of regulations; and also ensure that they address the problems they are meant to mitigate.

Because IRC is difficult to measure and because practice is widely distributed, it is hard to ascertain its pervasiveness. Therefore, the next section discusses the drivers of IRC and how it relates to the AEC Blueprint 2025.

2.4. The Drivers of International Regulatory Cooperation

There are three very different drivers for IRC: mutual economic benefit through liberalised trade and investment, strengthening the ability of states to deliver regulation effectively, and geopolitical and strategic imperatives (Bull et al., 2015).


Much of the literature focuses on the economic gains from improved coherence through reduced non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Regulatory diversity is a growing policy concern as tariffs have come down to near zero for many areas of trade, and multilateral liberalisation has stalled. Improving regulatory coherence between countries can remove unintended and unnecessary barriers to trade, thus facilitating international trade and investment and participation in global supply chains.⁶ According to this view, the economic logic for IRC is that it 'aims at finding a suitable balance between the (welfare) costs related to changes to domestic regulation and the benefits resulting from reducing regulation-related trade costs' (Tongeren, Bastien, and von Lampe, 2015: 1).

The degree of coordination required in IRC depends on the 'relative importance of benefits from keeping current regulation versus the costs stemming from regulatory heterogeneity between countries' (OECD, 2017). The trade costs of regulatory diversity heterogeneity arise because of specification costs (compliance), conformity costs (the cost of demonstrating conformity), and information costs. This line of reasoning leads to a simple trade-off between trade costs and domestic policy preferences: if trade costs are small but domestic preferences for a certain type of regulation are very strong, it is not worth it to undertake costly IRC processes; however, if trade costs are high relative to the benefits of keeping current regulation, the optimal outcome may be a significant reduction of regulatory divergence.

operating practices of IRC networks, and how the main focus is often on setting common standards but frequently extends beyond policy to other regulatory practices. They identify nine main IRC process on which international organisations engage: the exchange of information and experience; data collection; research and policy analysis; discussion of GRPs; development of rules, standards, and guidance; negotiation of international agreements; enforcement activities including the imposition of sanctions; dispute settlement; and crisis management. For a discussion of regulatory governance see World Bank (2019).

⁶ Non-tariff measures can be imposed for a range of reasons. For example, some of Malaysia's import barriers are aimed at maintaining cultural and religious norms. Technical barriers (discussed in Chapter 7), including halal certification for the importation of meat and poultry, are regulated through licensing and sanitary controls.

Figure 1.5. Trade Cost and Regulatory Divergence Trade-off



Source: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia.

However, the characterisation of IRC as an economic trade-off between ‘trade cost’ and ‘regulatory divergence’ is too narrow. For example, with cross-border spillover issues, what is optimal for a national unit may not be optimal for the wider community involved.

There is another logic at play for IRC beyond the economic logic of reducing NTBs. Somewhat paradoxically, one of the major drivers of IRC is strengthening the ability of states to deliver regulation effectively. There is a range of circumstances where regulatory effectiveness encourages countries to participate in IRC, including (i) increasing the reach of regulation across borders, which manages international spillovers; (ii) improving regulatory cost effectiveness as regulators share resources (this is particularly important for smaller and less developed countries facing capability problems, including achieving minimum critical mass); and (iii) improving regulatory quality, which reduces the cost of doing business.

For example, in the case of competition law, there has been a very large increase in the number of countries with a domestic competition law since the 1960s. Without competition law, there is no need for IRC. However, with a competition law regime in place, there is a need to develop IRC to manage spillovers between jurisdictions. A range of transgovernmental, intergovernmental, and a few supranational arrangements emerged as a result. The case of Australia–New Zealand cooperation on competition law is discussed in Chapter 3.

Finally, IRC inevitably involves strategic and geopolitical considerations. Foreign policy objectives of IRC include geopolitical gains, soft power through regulatory export, development assistance through technical cooperation, and obtaining ‘a seat at the table’. One example of regulatory competition and export is how the US and EU compete through their different approaches to regulation through IRC with neighbouring countries and globally. In addition, IRC can sometimes be an important means of avoiding interstate jurisdictional conflict by limiting attempts by dominant countries like the US to overreach in asserting extraterritoriality.

The OECD’s analysis of where regulatory networks operate around the world found two particularly dense institutional clusters in the areas of finance and health. ‘The modern international financial governance architecture is organised around a series of TGNs that

address specific functional areas of financial regulation, including supervision of banking, securities, and insurance markets; financial audits; private accounting standards; deposit insurance; trade and investment promotion; and competition law.... In the field of health, multilateral TGNs bring together leading regulators of pharmaceuticals, medical devices and cosmetics... [with a] focus on the technical requirements for registering new pharmaceuticals and veterinary medicine' (Abbott et al., 2018: 20).

At the regional level, around one-half of ASEAN's guidelines are focused on health-related material, including medical devices, pharmaceuticals, traditional medicines, and health supplements. These clusters highlight the range of policy rationales for undertaking IRC. Within a broad domain, there is a wide variety of specific areas of focus for IRC, with different policy rationales for IRC in each case. In short, the imperative for IRC is much broader than simply reducing NTBs.

2.5. International Regulatory Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economic Community Blueprint 2025

There are a number of drivers to increase IRC under the AEC. The AEC Blueprint 2025 creates an imperative for GRPs, including the improvement of IRC. IRC complements GRP in the AEC Blueprint 2025 and supports the drive for regulatory coherence within ASEAN. IRC is implicitly within the ambit of Section B.7 on effective, efficient, coherent, and responsive regulations and GRP.

In the context of the AEC Blueprint 2025, as tariffs have come down to near zero, regulatory and standard divergence is increasingly the main policy concern amongst policymakers, businesses, and think tanks. IRC can be used in a way that supports the drive for regulatory coherence within ASEAN and fosters more inclusive integration and economic growth. IRC can also help domestic regulators identify unintended spillover effects from rule making. For instance, when a car assembler and manufacturer in Thailand sources its electric components from Viet Nam, the standards applied in Thailand and Viet Nam must be coherent. IRC can facilitate trade at the extensive margin by encouraging the range of trade that occurs, and at the intensive margin by expanding the volume of trade undertaken.

IRC aims to improve connectivity by improving how regulations are designed and applied. For countries in the East Asia region, IRC is a means of reducing the costs of doing business, facilitating international trade and investment, and improving regulatory outcomes in a variety of areas. To determine how these potentials can be realised, ERIA, in partnership with the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, undertook this research project focusing on IRC in ASEAN and New Zealand.

2.6. Research Questions

A range of possible questions for a potential IRC study were identified, as follows: (i) why adopt IRC (e.g. what are the imperatives for IRC), (ii) where to use IRC (in which particular sectors or domains is IRC most productive), and (iii) when to use which forms (under what conditions are different types of IRC likely to be effective for particular problems). To reduce this list of demanding questions, the focus of the research was narrowed down to more practical questions about what is needed to make IRC successful.

Identifying what form of IRC works well for ASEAN Member States will allow countries to make more deliberate choices from a clearly articulated set of potential options. The project was designed to fill a gap in the literature by identifying the conditions required to

sustain IRC. These required 'conditions' could include pre-conditions, critical conditions, and supporting conditions.

The primary research questions for the project were:

- (i) What is the extent of IRC in the countries in the East Asia region (pervasiveness)?
- (ii) What are the enablers and facilitating factors of effective IRC (willingness and persuasiveness)?
- (iii) What are the main barriers and constraints that need to be overcome?

Given the diversity of IRC it was important to define what was in scope and what was out of scope for the project. The scope was national government-to-government regulatory cooperation, either transgovernmental, direct, regulatory agency-to-regulatory agency, or formal intergovernmental regulatory cooperation. The scope did not extend to private standards setters such as the International Organization for Standardization and Global Standards One, nor to government-to-government coordination on service delivery such as military or police cooperation.

2.7. The Research Design of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia International Regulatory Cooperation Project

We developed a four-phase, mixed-method approach to address the research questions. The project included all ASEAN countries as well as New Zealand, and involved a lead research institution from each country. The research involved four phases from 2018 to early 2020. Phase 1 consisted of desktop-based research to develop and refine the research approach, including the development of a survey questionnaire that was tested at a technical workshop (held in April 2018) on the IRC framework and survey methodology.


Phase 2 consisted of the survey administration and interviews. The interviews and survey were administered by researchers in each of the 10 countries (listed in Appendix 1). The researchers interviewed participants about their practical experiences with IRC and asked them to respond to the survey questions. While the New Zealand survey had the same structure and format as that used for respondents from the ASEAN countries, the contextual details were tailored to New Zealand's situation. Each researcher undertook up to 17 'elite' interviews with people with significant understanding of IRC drawn from a range of sectors. Figure 1.6 shows that the interlocutors were mainly in government (ministry or line agency), but some were academics or from the private sphere.

Phase 3 consisted of consolidation and integration. Each researcher produced a country report, which was discussed at a workshop on the research findings (held in Kuala Lumpur on 9–10 October 2018).

Phase 4 consisted of finalisation of the research publication. The final deliverable synthesised and articulated the key research findings.

Documentation of the research findings was completed just as the coronavirus disease emerged and began to spread in early 2020. Accordingly, the results reflect the thinking of the time before the pandemic.

Figure 1.6: Institutional Affiliations of Respondents



ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic.

Source: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia International Regulatory Cooperation Survey, Question 1.

In parallel with the ERIA-led project, the Government of New Zealand commissioned the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research to undertake four detailed IRC case studies on trans-Tasman competition law, the Asia Region Funds Passport, and two ASEAN examples of intellectual property and cosmetics (Gill, 2018). These cases, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, were discussed in the technical workshops to focus on practical lessons learned, barriers, and enablers.

This chapter has set out the context for the ERIA research project on IRC, the research questions, and the research approach. The next chapter will explore the research findings on IRC in Asia and the Pacific region, drawing mainly on the survey results and concluding with some reflections on future directions. Subsequent chapters will include practitioners’ insights into the craft of IRC and a selection of country case studies, including the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and New Zealand.

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
Appendix: Study Contributors

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