Chapter 4

Regulatory Coherence: The Case of the Republic Korea

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Chapter IV

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Part 1: The Evolution of Regulatory Management in the Republic of Korea

1. Introduction and Country Context

The legal system of the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) is a civil (codified) system based on the national Constitution. Since its adoption in 1948, the Constitution has been revised several times, most recently in 1987 at the beginning of the Sixth Republic. It sets out the structure of government and states there are three governmental branches: the legislative branch (National Assembly), the executive branch (Administration), and the judicial branch (Courts). As with most stable three-branch systems of government, it uses a system of checks and balances. For example, judges on the Constitutional Court are partially appointed by the executive and partially by the legislature. Likewise, a resolution of impeachment passed by the legislature, is sent to the judiciary for a final decision.

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The Development of Regulatory Management Systems in East Asia: Country Studies

Under the Constitution, legislation in the form of statutes or laws can be enacted by the National Assembly. When a law is passed by the National Assembly and sent to the executive branch, it is promulgated by the government on approval of the President through publication of its text in the government’s Official Gazette. Beneath statutes and laws are ‘Presidential Enforcement Decrees’, which is subordinate legislation made by the Cabinet or the State Council composed of ministers to implement a law. Below these decrees are ‘Rules’, which are regulations written by each ministry and used to implement practical details in accordance with a law or a presidential enforcement decree. Korea has a presidential system of government with a relatively independent chief executive. The executive and legislative branches operate primarily at the national level, although local governments also carry out local functions.

The Constitution states that local governments deal with matters pertaining to the welfare of local residents, and manage public property and facilities, and may enact provisions relating to local autonomy regulations within the limits of the law. The head of a local government manages and supervises administrative affairs except as otherwise provided by the law. The local executive functions include those delegated by the central government, such as the management of public property and facilities, and the assessment and collection of local taxes and fees for various services. Local governments have very limited policymaking authority. In general, most local government policies depend on how national policies are implemented, including regulatory reforms.

Korea is one of the world’s fastest-growing developing countries (KDI School and Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2012). Gross domestic product rose from US$5.313 trillion to US$11.292 trillion (Korea was ranked the 12th-largest economy in the world in 2012). However, in terms of economic freedom, Korea scored only 70.3, making its economy the 34th freest among the 177 countries included in the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom (by the Heritage Foundation), with declines in labour and monetary freedom offset by gains in the management of public spending and fiscal freedom over the previous year. Korea was ranked eighth in terms of the Economic Freedom Index out of 41 countries in 2014 in the Asia–Pacific region (The Heritage Foundation, 2014). According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the estimate for regulatory quality in Korea was 0.3 in 1998, but this increased to 1.0 in 2011. The index of regulatory quality indicates that overall regulatory quality improved considerably over a relatively short period (The World Bank Group, 2013).
Overall regulatory quality improved dramatically from 1996 to 2013 (Figure 4.1).

As shown in Figure 4.2, government effectiveness also improved over the same period.
2. The Evolution of Korea’s Regulatory Management System

2.1. Evolution with Each Administration

In the evolution of Korea’s Regulatory Management System (RMS), the initial area of focus was control and management of regulatory inflation. Regulations were often of low quality, increasingly obsolete, indeed harmful to fast-changing economic and social conditions, even in their early stages.

The goals of the RMS have evolved with each change in administration:

- **Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998.2–2003.2):** Recovery from the financial crisis
- **Roh Moo-hyun Administration (2003.2–2008.2):** Realisation of social equity and qualitative regulatory reform
- **Park Geun-hye Administration (2013.2–present):** Economic revitalisation and creative economy

The objectives of the RMS are to improve economic performance, quality of life, and government effectiveness, including regulatory transparency and accountability. The RMS clarifies the goal that reform policies should pursue market-friendly regulations suitable for a global environment by replacing command-and-control instruments with market competition (Choi, 2001).

The **Kim Dae-jung Administration**

The Kim Dae-jung Administration was launched in 1997 during a period of foreign exchange turbulence in Asia that was to lead to the full-blown Asian financial crisis. To receive an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout package at the end of 1997, immediately before the beginning of the Kim Dae-jung Administration, the government had to agree to the conditions of the IMF. Many of the requirements were related to economic regulatory reform, including capital market opening, improving corporate governance structures, and restructuring the economy along market principles. As a consequence, regulatory reform became a major political goal of the Kim Dae-jung Administration from the start. The Presidential Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) was established in...
accordance with the Framework Act on Administrative Regulations (FAAR), legislated at the end of the Kim Dae-jung Administration (Kim, T.Y., 2003).

Based on the FAAR, the RRC was responsible for all regulations under the jurisdiction of various government offices. A total of 11,125 regulations were registered with the RRC, and the committee set the goal of eliminating 50 percent of these, abolishing 5,430 cases (or 48.8 percent) and improving 2,411 cases (or 21.7 percent) in 1998. In 1999, the RRC reviewed the remaining 6,811 regulations that had been neither abolished nor improved in 1998, abolishing 704 cases (or 7.4 percent) and improving 570 cases (or 8.4 percent). In 2000, it reviewed 2,533 regulations stipulated in lower administrative orders, such as public announcements, guidelines, and by-laws and 1,675 quasi-administrative regulations enforced by associations and public corporations, modifying 2,045 cases (or 57.2 percent) of the total (Ha and Choi, 2012).

The Roh Moo-hyun Administration

No administration in Korea had been more socialist in its political leanings than the Roh Moo-hyun Administration. Generally speaking, this administration placed greater emphasis on distribution and balanced development than on efficiency. Regulatory reform was not a major concern and the role of the RRC was diminished during the government’s initial stages. However, the government later realised that the lack of any major regulatory reform effort was one of the reasons for disappointing investment levels by corporations and weak job creation. As a result, the government subsequently began to push for regulatory reform (Kim and Lee, 2008).

The government emphasised improving regulatory quality rather than reducing the quantity of regulations, focusing on ‘bundled regulations’ that stretched across a broad range of ministries. The Presidential Council for Promoting Regulatory Reform convened by the President and the Ministerial Meeting for Regulatory Reform presided over by the Prime Minister were both established in 2004, while the Regulatory Reform Task Force (RRTF) was formed as an affiliated organisation (Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2010). The government let the RRTF improve key regulations, while allowing the RRC to examine regulations that had been recently promulgated or required strengthening, as well as regulations that needed to be improved according to the FAAR.
The Lee Myung-bak Administration

Although the Lee Myung-bak Administration gave high priority to regulatory reform in its national agenda, the regulatory information system (RIS) was not running well at that time. It was widely acknowledged that systematic digitisation of regulatory information would be required for effective regulatory information, registration, and review (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a). Hence, the administration set up a basic plan for establishing a RIS in 2009 and conducted a sunset project to improve the functioning of the RIS. As a result, the entire regulatory life cycle was digitised and can now be accessed online. These regulation stages included new and reinforced regulation proposals, regulatory review data, registered regulations, expired regulations, and annual regulatory reform performance reports (Lee, 2012).

The government also provided a Regulatory Information Portal service through a comprehensive overhaul of the RRC’s homepage after 2010, to provide regulatory information in easier and more convenient ways. The Regulatory Information Portal was expected to make it easier for users to search for laws and regulations one by one by ensuring more systematic regulatory management. The government also enhanced regulatory quality and administrative efficiency to upgrade the system to integrate and manage all central and local government regulations (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a).

The Park Geun-hye Administration

The current Park Geun-hye Administration has taken the initiative in regulatory reform by reducing regulation and lowering obstacles in the public sector. It is focusing vigorously on removing unnecessary regulation and renovating the legal system to enable individuals or businesses with creative ideas to turn them into new products and services, and quickly enter the market. To achieve this, the government is building soft infrastructure to enable convergence between different industrial sectors by allowing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to enter the market without unnecessary barriers. It is also taking steps to remove unnecessary walls between government agencies by building a system of creative collaboration to provide one-stop services that meet the needs of companies (Korea Culture and Information Service, 2014).

1 http://www.rrc.go.kr
The motivation and active participation of civil servants are a fundamental element in the success of regulatory reform. Regulatory reform, like any other government reform, is doomed to fail without enlisting the backing of civil servants who hold the key to the executive branch. The Park Geun-hye Administration is making great efforts to change Korea’s civil service culture into one that is more conducive to regulatory reform (Kim, J.K., 2014).

Recognising the importance of regulatory reform, President Park has been addressing regulations that are a major obstacle in each sector in her ‘Ministerial Meetings on Regulatory Reform’ chaired by herself. On 20 March 2014, the President presided over ministerial and official private–public sector meetings on regulatory reform in the manner of an ‘ultimate debate’, pushing forward regulatory reform by encouraging openness, communication, and participation (Kim, S.J., 2014). The Park Geun-hye Administration’s regulatory reform is particularly meaningful because it is being actively pursued by strong presidential leadership. It has engaged with both the private and the public sectors, and the entire process is open for all people to see and communicate on in a transparent manner. This demonstrates that regulatory reform clearly reflects the administration’s governance philosophy of openness, sharing, communication, and cooperation (Korea Culture and Information Service, 2014).

Figure 4.3. Organisational Chart

Source: Korea Culture and Information Service, 2014.
2.2. Changes in Focus over Time

In a globalised, market-driven economy, traditional government regulations were challenged because of the heavy regulatory burden imposed on businesses, the degree of administrative discretion required, and the low levels of compliance. The RMS therefore focused on eliminating outmoded and excessive regulation, and establishing instead a comprehensive and systematic mechanism to effectively review and manage new regulations.

The focus of regulatory reform and economic policy of the Kim Dae-jung Administration aimed to support recovery from the economic crisis that had erupted towards the end of 1997. In compliance with the FAAR, the administration set up the RRC, which was under direct presidential control. The RRC conducted a review and reform of existing regulations, together with a review of new and reinforced regulations, following the RMS as stipulated in the FAAR. This enabled Korea to overcome the challenges of the crisis, thanks to its regulatory reforms (Lee, 2011).

The Roh Moo-hyun Administration did not claim to make regulatory reform one of its major policy agenda items in the early phase of its term. On the contrary, there was a strong perception that regulatory reform might be used to secure the interests of higher-income groups by pursuing a policy of relentless competition in the market, rather than protecting lower-income citizens. Such an inclination led to the incapacitation of the RRC and its functions. However, robust global economic growth notwithstanding, no significant progress was made in terms of job creation. The government subsequently realised that these problems were attributable to sluggish corporate investment. Regulatory reform was therefore seen as a necessity to improve regulatory quality, although not to reduce the number of regulations (Ha and Choi, 2012).

The Lee Myung-bak Administration put regulatory reform at the top of its policy agenda, as the best way of enhancing national competitiveness and creating jobs. Under the Presidential Council on National Competitiveness (PCNC), the regulatory reform steering group was jointly operated by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and the government, while the RRC was kept intact. The key ‘policy regulations’ – such as those for governing metropolitan areas, restrictions on share ownership, and the separation between industrial and financial capital –
underwent extensive reform. All of these areas were previously considered untouchable, so these reform efforts were proof of remarkable progress. Progress was made in upgrading the basis for enhancing quality control, and carrying out scientific and rational management of regulations by instituting various regulatory reform measures, such as conducting temporary regulatory relief to overcome the economic crisis, applying sunset clauses to more regulations, registering unlisted regulations, and setting up an information system for regulations (Lee, 2011).

The Park Geun-hye Administration is now focusing on regulatory reform to foster a creative economy. The term ‘creative economy’ means the process of creating jobs and industries through the convergence of science, technology, culture, and industry in new and innovative ways. Park’s strategies to achieve economic targets include tackling public sector reforms and boosting domestic demand by promoting SMEs and the services sector, together with comprehensive regulatory reform. The Park Geun-hye Administration is implementing sweeping regulatory reforms at home to facilitate investment to stimulate domestic demand, while externally it is stepping up efforts to create a business environment that is more favourable to foreign companies than any other country in the world. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act endorsed by the government was passed in February 2014 and is expected to generate about ₩2.3 trillion of investment and 14,000 new jobs. Moreover, the Tourism Promotion Act is expected to create about ₩2 trillion in new investment and 47,000 new jobs.

2.3. Changes in the Locus of Regulatory Management System over Time

Since 2010, the locus of RMS has shifted towards more positive ways of listening to and understanding public opinion based on the FAAR, after it had been located not far from the government’s main offices in its early stages. If the head of a central administrative agency intends to establish a new regulation or reinforce an existing regulation, he/she should gather the opinions of other administrative agencies, civic groups, interested parties, research institutes, and experts through public hearings and the pre-announcement of legislation (Article 9, Hearing Public Opinions, FAAR).

The website for regulatory reform allows citizens to voice their opinions on everything from issues relating to regulatory reform, to civil servants who have
made a positive contribution towards reform, to less successful aspects of reform. All opinions that citizens submit are automatically transferred to the Regulatory Information Portal of the Office of Government Policy Coordination and processed quickly. All recommendations for improving regulatory systems receive a reply within 14 days from the relevant government organisation concerning their applicability.

2.4. Changes of Key Themes

The Korean government began to intensively review and examine new or reinforced regulations through the RRC (RRC, 2014). Sixteen years after it was first established in 1998, the RRC is currently being led by its eighth chairman, and its members are composed of regulatory reform experts from academia, business, and citizen groups.

The PCNC was established under the Lee Myung-bak Administration as a new presidential regulatory reform organisation. While the RRC focused on examining new and reinforced regulations, managing regulatory information and the regulatory reform of each ministry, and the rearrangement and management of regulatory reform-related policies, the PCNC’s emphasis was on strengthening national competitiveness by controlling key policies that have a greater impact on state affairs and bundles of regulations that involve multiple ministries. But no clear boundaries of working scope were drawn between the RRC and the PCNC in dealing with the reform of existing regulation, allowing them to engage in mutual cooperation and competition for regulatory projects.

The Lee Myung-bak Administration also established the Public–Private Joint Regulatory Reform Task Force composed of government officials and staff from the PCNC and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, with the goal of reforming regulation in the field of business (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a). The task force hosted meetings jointly with local chambers of commerce and associations to engage in talks with the relevant people and visited industrial sites and engaged in face-to-face dialogues with business people. The task force is a private entity made up of experts and government officials, and is able to make rapid decisions regarding regulatory issues and proposals for their reform. Through such a system, the percentage of cases accepted as needing reform increased to 80 percent, from the previous 30 percent (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a).
The government has pursued e-Government as a core vehicle to sharpen its competitive edge, based on its global-leading information technology (IT) network and software infrastructure, such as widespread broadband internet network, Government for Citizens (G4C), and Government for Business (G4B) Internet sites. It has initiated the ‘Smart e-Government Strategy’ to help people access public services without constraints of space, time, or medium by integrating Korea’s cutting-edge IT technology and public services. The strategy is also part of continuous government efforts to address Korea’s low birth rate, its ageing population, and other social issues, and to proactively respond to social security, public welfare, and future issues (Ministry of Security and Public Administration, 2013).

3. The Current State of the Regulatory Management System

3.1. Flow and Stock Policy Tools

The principle of cost-effective regulation in Korea was consolidated by the implementation of regulatory impact analysis (RIA). RIA is the ‘means to predict and analyse the impact of a regulation on the everyday lives of citizens, as well as on the social, economic, administrative and any other aspects, by using objective and scientific means and thus to establish a standard which serves as the basis for determining the appropriateness of the regulation’ (Article 2 of FAAR). RIA reports are prepared for the issuance of new regulations and the reinforcement of existing regulations. RIA has become an effective tool for improving the quality of regulation on the basis of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) and other analytical tools.

To enhance the efficiency of RIA, the government revised its guidance manual in December 2008, specifying the details of those groups subject to regulation and interested parties. To raise the effectiveness of the administration and encourage the compiling of the analysis, the RRC had ministries use the RIA draft without having to create additional data. It also encouraged them to use the RIA report for regulatory review (Office for Government Policy Coordination, 2013).

One of the most remarkable changes was the removal of unnecessary factors in RIA guidance and the addition of multiple regulatory alternatives in the CBA.
In addition, the intensity and methods of regulation, and whether they limit market competition and impact due to the difference in size of the businesses, were added to the contents of the RIA report (RRC, 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Proposal</th>
<th>Examination of the necessity of establishing new regulations/reinforcing existing ones; identifying regulatory alternatives; and consulting with relevant agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-announcement of Legislation and Sending the RIA Report to the RRC</td>
<td>Announcement of RIA report when pre-announcing the legislation; Submission of the draft regulation and RIA to the RRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Examination</td>
<td>Review of RIA and consultation with relevant agencies; Independent examination – central administrative agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRC Examination</td>
<td>Review by the RRC of RIA and the proposed regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination by the Ministry of Government Legislation</td>
<td>The rule is finalised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RRC = Presidential Regulatory Reform Committee.
Source: Prime Minister’s Office, 2013b.

The ‘stock’ policy tool is regulated under the FAAR. According to Article 8 of the FAAR, the effective (or review) period for which a regulation remains in force is set as no longer than that required to achieve the objectives of the regulation,
and the period must not exceed 5 years. If an extension of the effective (or review) period of a regulation is necessary, the head of the central administrative agency will request an examination by the RRC 6 months before its expiry (Article 8 – Stipulation of Effective Period of Regulations).

The ‘sunset system’ on existing regulations was put forward by the Lee Myung-bak Administration. The government studied the possibility of introducing a sunset system on all existing regulations twice, in November 2009 and June 2010, and concluded that 1,600 regulations out of about 7,000 existing regulations (about 23 percent) were subject to a sunset system review. The regulations subject to the sunset system were made public and managed through the RIS to enhance public trust in regulatory reform. The number of applications of the sunset system since 2010 has continued to increase, indicating that the new system has successfully taken root.

**Table 4.2. Components of Regulatory Impact Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Need for Regulation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1. Problem statement (background and causes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2. Need for establishing new regulations and reinforcing existing regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Review of regulatory alternatives and CBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1. Review of regulatory alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2. Comparison of the CBA results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3. RIA of small and medium-sized enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Propriety and feasibility of regulatory content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1. Adequacy of regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2. Consultation with stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3. Feasibility of implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CBA = cost–benefit analysis.
Source: Prime Minister’s Office, 2013b.

Under the current RMS, all regulations must be based on legislation and a central administrative agency must register a regulation with the RRC. According to the Enforcement Decree of the FAAR, the head of a central administrative agency must register the name, content, legal basis, administrative agency, extension of the effective period, contents of lower statutes related to implementation, and the date of promulgation and implementation of the regulation (Article 4,
Registration and Procedures of Regulation). This register system makes the management of the stock of regulations relatively more efficient and more transparent. The RRC developed a computerised database system in 1999 and has since published this database online (Kim and Kim, 2014).

Since its introduction, Korea has struggled to effectively review existing regulations, similar to most countries. As a result, the Park Geun-hye Administration recently established the Public–Private Joint Expert Committee under the RRC to strengthen the regulatory review system. This committee is composed of two subcommittees: the Expert Committee for Institution Study (ECI) and the Expert Committee for Costs (ECC). The ECI carries out research on regulatory institutions and evaluates existing regulations issued by industries and citizens, while the ECC supports the operation of a regulation cost system (cost-in, cost-out), etc.

3.2. The Regulatory Reform Committee

To launch systematic and comprehensive regulatory reform, Korea enacted the FAAR and set up the RRC in 1998 (Article 23 of the FAAR, 1998). Since its establishment, the RRC has played a key role in the RMS, as it has the legal authority to substantially review all ministries’ plans for regulatory transparency.

The RRC consists of civilian members, government members, and two co-chairs (the Prime Minister and a civilian co-chair). It is responsible for deliberating the basic direction of regulatory policy, as well as reviewing and improving the RMS (Choi, 2003).

Activities related to implementing methods and procedures refer to the decision mechanism, which includes aggressive participation of the private sector and implementation of RIA. These features are required for reforms to be processed and depend primarily on the political will and capacity of reformers. Both participation of the private sector and RIA implementation are invaluable in helping to persuade interest groups to agree to reform (Park and Im, 2009).
Figure 4.4. Organisation of the Regulatory Reform Committee


The RRC holds the central position in managing the RMS and reform policy under the auspices of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has a coordinating capacity and distinctive role in interlinking with central ministries and the RRC. The central administrative agencies and local governments operate their own regulatory review committees, consisting of civilian representatives and government officials, similar to the RRC. When the central administrative agencies improve or modify regulations, they have their own regulation review committee to review the regulations prior to submission to the RRC. They have also set up and implemented their own annual regulatory review.

The head of a central administrative agency must request an examination by the RRC if he/she intends to establish a new regulation or reinforce an existing regulation. In cases of a legislative bill, the request for an examination must be made prior to filing a request for an examination of the legislative bill with the Minister of Government Legislation. When an examination is requested, he/she must submit to the RRC a draft of the regulation, along with the following documents (Article 10, Request for Examination):
1. RIA report under Article 7(1);
2. Opinion from an independent examination under Article 7(3); and
3. Summary of opinions submitted by administrative agencies, interested parties, etc. under Article 9.

**Figure 4.5. The Process of Formulating Regulation**

![Diagram showing the process of formulating regulation](image)

**Figure 4.6. Review Process of New/Amended Regulation**

![Diagram showing the review process of new/amended regulation](image)

RRC = Presidential Regulatory Reform Committee.
Source: Authors.
The coverage of the RMS has changed since 1997. The Kim Dae-jung Administration made an exception for the affairs executed by the National Assembly, the Courts, the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, and the Board of Audit and Inspection; and the affairs relevant to criminal matters, criminal administration, and security measures. It also excluded matters relevant to national security, defence, foreign affairs, unification, and tax, which are not subject to the FAAR, as determined by presidential decree.

The Roh Moo-hyun Administration supplemented some exclusions, such as matters relevant to (i) enrolment, draft, mobilisation, and training; (ii) military installations, the protection of military secrets, and the defence industry; and (iii) the items, rates, imposition, and collection of taxes (FAAR, 1997; 2005).

The scope of the current RMS encompasses broad economic and social regulations except those concerning taxation, national defence, and punitive measures (Article 3, Scope of Application) as follows:

- Affairs executed by the National Assembly, the Courts, the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, and the Board of Audit and Inspection;
- Affairs relevant to criminal matters, criminal administration, and security measures;
- Matters relevant to information and security-related duties under the National Intelligence Service Act;
- Matters relevant to enrolment, draft, mobilisation, and training under the provisions of the Military Service Act, the United Defense Act, the Establishment of Homeland Reserve Forces Act, the Framework Act on Civil Defense, the Emergency Resources Management Act, and the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety;
3.3. The Role of Local Government Regulation

Local governments play an instrumental role in implementing regulatory reform down to street level in Korea. They develop regulatory reforms that are best suited to their own local circumstances, as the central government delegates its functions to a subordinate authority. They may enact municipal ordinances concerning their affairs within the purview of laws and subordinate statutes.

When local governments determine matters concerning restrictions on the rights of residents, the imposition of obligations on residents, or penal provisions, they must have the authority delegated by law. Heads of local governments may enact municipal rules concerning their competent affairs to the extent delegated by laws and subordinate statutes, or by municipal ordinances (Articles 22 and 23, Local Autonomy Act).

3.4. Regulatory Oversight Mechanism

Overall regulatory oversight for regulatory reform is mostly undertaken by the government, with the Office for Government Policy Coordination (including the RRC) as the central agency. The RRC makes regulatory information and regulatory review results open to the public through the RIS, while also utilising the RIS to collect opinions from the public (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013a).

Furthermore, the regulatory oversight mechanism is manned by citizens’ active participation through the SME ombudsman and citizens’ monitoring groups, among others (Regulatory Reform White Paper, 2013). The government provides information on all regulations, as well as the government’s regulatory reform efforts, on the Regulatory Reform Portal Site so that people can oversee and contribute to the reform process in real time.
The Korean government allowed for regulatory oversight by establishing an Ombudsman Office for SMEs under the Small and Medium Business Administration to reflect the opinions of SMEs. Since its inception, the Ombudsman Office for SMEs has registered 3,634 cases of difficulty and dealt with 3,338 of those cases. For instance, the mandatory use of accredited certificates was highlighted as a barrier to active electronic banking after hearings. For this reason, the relevant regulations were improved to enable small transactions of under US$282 through smart phones without accredited certificates. Such reform has enabled SMEs to reduce costs by US$250 million annually, which had previously been used for applying for the accredited certificates (Prime Minister's Office, 2013a).

3.5. Evaluation

According to the FAAR, the RRC verifies and inspects the improvement in, and operational conditions of, the regulations of each administrative agency to measure the effective regulatory improvement and may request that relevant institutions conduct public opinion surveys to objectively carry out verification, inspection, and evaluation. The RRC must evaluate the findings of the verification and inspection, and report back to the President and the State Council. If the RRC deems that regulatory improvement has been passive or not implemented appropriately based on the results of its verification, inspection, and evaluation, it may suggest necessary revisions to the President (Article 34, Inspection and Evaluation of Regulatory Improvement).

| Table 4.3. Regulatory Reform Satisfaction Index |
|---|---|---|
|   | Citizens | Policy Experts | Civil Servants |
| 2005 | 56.2 | 61.0 | - |
| 2006 | 58.2 | 67.7 | - |
| 2007 | 54.8 | 63.0 | - |
| 2008 | 59.5 | 66.3 | 60.7 |
| 2009 | 62.9 | 66.5 | 63.6 |
| 2010 | 64.8 | 70.7 | 63.9 |
| 2011 | 65.0 | 72.6 | 64.1 |
| 2012 | 67.6 | 73.1 | 68.7 |
| 2013 | 65.7 | 71.9 | 69.0 |

In addition, the RRC must publish annually and promulgate a white paper regarding the status of major government regulatory reform issues to citizens (Article 35, White Paper on Regulatory Reform). The Prime Minister’s annual budget for regulatory reform is US$1,557,059 (Annual Revenue Expenditure Budget, 2014). Almost half of this total budget, or US$764,998, is assigned for operating costs of the RRC. In 2014, about 28 percent went towards building an information system for regulatory reform and 22 percent went towards the operations of the Public–Private Joint Regulatory Reform Task Force.

4. Assessment of Korea’s Regulatory Management System

4.1. Coherence

Korea adopts a whole-of-government approach towards RMS and regulatory reform. The RMS is based on a permanent regulatory reform system, and regulatory reform has been consistently carried out by the RRC. Under the PMO, the RRC is able to comprehensively determine the basic direction of regulatory policy horizontally across different domestic regimes and vertically across levels of government. Most critical ‘bundled regulations’ are interconnected with the affairs of multiple ministries. The PMO, whose role is to coordinate the diverse stances across ministries, is in charge of dealing with core regulations and bundled regulations involving multiple ministries. The PMO and each ministry are encouraged to compete in pursuing regulatory reform through the systematic assignment of duties according to their resulting impact and importance.

The Regulatory Reform Task Force was established to tackle the difficulties faced by businesses and to monitor the effects of regulatory reform regularly. In an effort to deal with new or strengthened regulations, the PMO established a seamless regulatory reform system, reviewing the need and feasibility of regulation by reflecting people’s stances, not those of the relevant agencies.

The PMO formed in 2006 a ‘Local Government Regulatory Reform Task Force’, which combined government officials from the Office of Government Policy Coordination, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA), and experts from research institutes. It also expanded training opportunities for local government officials to change their regulatory mindset.
and enhance their skills. The PMO refers reform issues and proposals collected from local governments and businesses to the central government for review (RRC, 2006). The Park Geun-hye Administration has spurred more regulatory reform by local governments, as it sees this as being essential for the implementation of effective reform (MOGAHA, 2014).

To ensure international coherence, the RRC has also abolished existing regulations that fail to fit global standards. The RRC participates in various international cooperation programmes, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Country Review (1999–2000), the OECD review of regulatory review monitoring programme (2006–2007), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Deregulation Report. The 2000 OECD Review stated that the cumbersome Korean system of standards and conformity certification was deemed by trading partners to be a source of obstacles to trade. Since then, the government has implemented an active policy in favour of enhanced transparency of the standardisation and certification system, and increased the use of global standards (OECD, 2007). To strengthen regulatory coherence, the RRC ensures that policies for all concerned areas are mutually supportive. The central government initially sets the regulatory reform agenda and then the regional and local governments follow. This mechanism for coordination within and between governments on regulation and its reform is set up to maximise the benefits of reform and strengthen regulatory coherence.

To avoid duplication and inconsistency of regulations, the RRC introduced a central registration system for regulations. Ministries are required to register regulations under their jurisdiction to the RRC in a form that includes the content of regulations, the legal authority, and the responsible agency. Using this registration system, Korea has established a useful database for subsequent regulatory management.

4.2. Assessment

By and large, Korea has made significant progress in terms of establishing a robust RMS required to enhance regulatory quality and to succeed in regulatory reform. As the OECD said, Korea’s massive deregulation was fairly effective and intensive in dealing with the effects of the economic crisis within a short period after the Kim Dae-jung Administration (OECD, 2000).
In its initial stages, regulatory reform focused on the quantity, rather than the quality, of regulation. It relied heavily on political support stemming from the desire to recover from the economic crisis. The government has actively adopted OECD recommendations and guidelines since then (OECD, 2007). As a result, the focus of regulatory reform shifted from reducing the overall quantity of regulations to improving regulatory quality. This transformation was impressive in that it occurred relatively rapidly. However, both political will and government efforts to maintain the momentum of reform subsequently weakened, and the pace and intensity of reform slowed as the economy recovered. The Lee Myung-bak Administration recognised regulatory reform as a means to increase national competitiveness and made regulatory reform an important government priority. In effect, the President became a strong advocate in pushing for regulatory reform. The current Park Geun-hye Administration is aware that regulatory reform serves to solidify national competitiveness and to bolster the creative economy. The Park Geun-hye Administration is placing greater emphasis on implementing more advanced and comprehensive reform measures. To date, institutionalised reform in Korea has been successful in dealing with potential problems of reform by strengthening policy attention and public support. The government has tried to maintain reform momentum by giving it a high priority to meet public expectations.

The current registration system for regulations coming from local governments in Korea has not been managed and operated efficiently, especially compared with central government administration. Poor and inconsistent registration of regulations at the local level of government has resulted in fundamentally inefficient and incomplete regulatory reform in local governments.

In sum, the government’s efforts to improve RMS and regulatory reform have produced major gains in moving towards a global market-driven economy. The radical approach of the current government is remarkable, having had a tremendous impact on the entire regulatory stock. It has laid the groundwork for moving towards market-driven regulations by clearing regulations through government intervention.

In Parts 2 and 3 of this chapter, we explore the details of two regulatory changes: golf course construction controls and the opening hours of food service businesses. In particular, we explore regulatory reform in response to the
economic crisis of the late 1990s and the evolving process of regulatory reform and the RMS.

Part 2 on the evolution of golf course regulation in Korea illustrates that multiple regulatory responses are necessary to adequately respond to the unintended consequences of regulation. Because of its iterative nature, golf course regulation was responsive to environmental needs, as well as to industry demands and the government’s attempts to transform existing policy.

**Part 2: The Case of Golf Course Regulation in Korea**

**1. Introduction**

Until the early 2000s, it took a great deal of time and effort to undertake and complete the construction of a golf course in Korea; the administrative procedures alone took 3 to 4 years. Since the reform carried out in accordance with the ‘Golf Course Promotion Policy’ in 2004, the time required has been halved to around 1 to 2 years. Regarding the economic benefits as a result of regulatory reform, total administrative cost savings of ₩3.7 billion have been made for each golf course, and total potential savings of ₩388.5 billion may have been made if applied to all 105 golf courses that were under construction during the period (Lee et al., 2006).

The contribution of regulatory reform towards golf course construction has not simply been limited to reducing administrative costs and the time required. As a golf course is being constructed, the economic effects are also positive as a result of the hiring of local residents and stimulating the construction business (Cho, 2004). The number of golf course users has increased in accordance with the government’s efforts to promote golf as a popular public sport since 1988. Such positive economic effects have been pioneered through golf course construction and have also worked as a driving force in mitigating burdensome golf course regulations. However, some unintended side effects were caused by mitigating a number of golf site regulations. To construct golf courses at lower cost, entrepreneurs began construction in mountainous areas where land is cheaper.

# Part 2 is authored by Song June Kim.
However, nearby areas suffered environmental damage. For example, agricultural pesticides used in managing grass on golf courses caused environmental contamination in neighbouring areas.

Throughout this process, Korea’s RMS has attempted to consider both the benefits and costs, and to reflect the opinions of both experts, and directly concerned parties and environmental organisations. As a result, the RMS has developed into a more objective and transparent system. The improvement of the RMS has played a significant role in minimising the extent of trial and error in the process of regulatory reform and reducing the social costs. Likewise, Korea has reformed golf course regulations in a way that mitigates the burden of the regulations and any negative impacts of this mitigation of regulatory burdens simultaneously.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the evolving process of regulatory reform and the RMS with special reference to the case of golf course regulatory reform. The efficient and effective ways of implementing regulatory reform is also discussed, by examining the characteristics of the RMS for successful golf course regulation and by understanding the improvements in the RMS.

2. The Requests for Regulatory Reform

Taking the opportunity of the ‘Declaration of Golf Popularization’ in 1988, the Korean government has consistently implemented its Golf Course Promotion Policy in pursuit of stimulating the domestic economy by means of promoting the popularity of golf and absorbing the demand of golf tourists to go overseas in pursuit of golf (Green Korea United [GKU], 2008). As a result, the number of annual golf course users increased significantly – from 500,000 in 1990, to 1.7 million in 2000, and to 3.71 million in 2009 (Oh and Jeon, 2010). This shows the degree to which golf became a popular public sport, with a participation rate of 8.5 percent among the domestic population in 2009.

The steady increase in the number of golf courses in Korea can be largely explained by supply side and demand side factors. First, on the supply side, the increase was due to a significant decrease in the burden on golf course entrepreneurs stemming from the government’s support for tax and financial
benefits in 1989. The government reduced or exempted composite land tax, valuable land tax, and added a special consumption tax for golf course entrepreneurs, as well as transforming luxurious property into general property. In the case of companies constructing golf courses, the government recognised this as being for business purposes, paving the way for companies to obtain bank loans for the construction (GKU, 2008). As a result, major companies could participate in the golf course business with greater ease, and the financial burdens for golf course construction decreased considerably, while investors could cover construction costs through bank loans and membership distribution (Wang, 1991).

Second, in the early 2000s, golf courses were generating high rates of return. The average rate of return of listed companies at that time was 7.2 percent; but by adopting a membership system, golf courses could produce about 3.6 times this level of profit, at 26.1 percent. Companies that had been unable to find alternative investments due to the economic recession were motivated to make profits through golf course construction (Mo, 2006).

From the perspective of consumers, demand for golf increased in line with rising income levels and the partial implementation of a 5-day working week. From 2003 to 2004 in particular, the increase in the number of people using public golf courses who did not have membership, at 9.5 percent, was higher than the rate increase seen among membership-based users, at just 4.9 percent. This indicated that the popularity of golf accelerated based on the rise in the number of golf course users, paving the way for an enlargement of the golf course user base (Mo, 2006).

Third, golf courses are one of the main sources of economic resources for local governments. The taxes levied on golf courses consist of acquisition tax, registration tax, property tax, and comprehensive real estate tax, plus a specific consumption tax and value-added tax that are levied on golf course users (Oh and Jeon, 2010). Taxes that can be drawn on by local governments are acquisition tax, registration tax, property tax, specific consumption tax, and value-added tax. These tax revenues are an attractive means of raising funds by local governments, given their normally weak base of financial resources. Golf courses are large-scale businesses requiring an average W60 billion to construct and secure regular tax revenues from golf course users.
Despite the steady increase in domestic demand for golf, however, there have been problems with the slow pace of golf market growth due to a shortage in supply and with a surge in outbound golf tourism due to relatively expensive fees at home. Compared with population per golf course in major countries in 2003, the United States had one golf course for every 14,000 people; Japan had one golf course for every 52,000 people; and the United Kingdom had one golf course for every 28,000 people. In contrast, Korea had one golf course for every 210,000 people. Given the level of income in Korea compared with other countries, demand for golf courses seems to be inadequate (RRC, 2003). For this reason, the high cost of golf in Korea, making it more expensive than other countries, has led to an increase in Korean golf tourists going overseas to play golf. This is the reason the number of overseas golf tourists has continuously increased – from 40,940 in 2000, to 54,697 in 2001, and to 93,135 in 2002, and then to more than 100,000 golfers in 2003 (The Hankook Ilbo, 2003).

In 2003, the government discussed institutional measures to expand golf course construction to mitigate the imbalance between supply and demand, and absorb overseas golf tourists, as well as creating jobs and stimulating local economies as part of an effort by the then government’s economic stimulus policy. First and foremost, the government attempted to simplify the approvals procedure for expanding golf course construction and to improve regulation in an environment-friendly way. For this, a joint task force was established to investigate policy measures to deal with location-related problems, improve the approvals procedure, reduce the financial burden, and strengthen environmental management in response to golf course construction by reviewing current regulations and case studies. The government then estimated that the effect of golf course construction on the local economy would reach ₩137.9 billion and create 1,145 new jobs each year. For an 18-hole membership-based golf course construction, this includes ₩78.9 billion of production effect, ₩33.3 billion of added-value effect, ₩17.1 billion of income effect, ₩2.7 billion of net indirect tax effect, and ₩5 billion–₩9 billion of registration tax and acquisition tax (Mo, 2006).
3. The Process of Regulatory Reform

3.1. Existing Golf Course Regulation (before 2003)

The 1988 Golf Promotion Policy mainly focused on the maintenance of laws and a reduction in the tax burden. As a result, the government changed the legal basis for golf courses in order to set the stage for developing golf into a major public sport in 1989. Golf courses, once included in the category of ‘luxurious facilities’ according to the ‘Tourism Promotion Act’, were then included in the category of ‘physical training facilities’ in accordance with the legislation of the ‘Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act (IUSFA)’. Accordingly, golf courses were transformed from amusement parks into physical sites, according to the Cadastral Act, and received benefits by being exempt from onerous taxes. One decade later, in 1999, the obligations to establish golf courses as an annex and to pay for a golf course development fund were abolished, according to IUSFA. Accommodation could be set up inside a golf course. The financial burden of managing a golf course was also minimised, thanks to taxation benefits, whereby the rate of acquisition tax was reduced from 15 percent to 10 percent (Mo, 2006).

The government-led Golf Promotion Policy, however, has not always been consistent. Despite mitigating regulations aimed at minimising burdens on golf course management and promoting a wide range of facilities, one site regulation that has a direct impact on the increasing number of golf courses has been reinforced. The government legislated ‘Criteria for the Formulation of Landscape Plans in a Quasi-Urban Area’ to reinforce regulations on facility standards in semi-urban areas in February 2001, restricting reckless golf course construction in 2003 under the ‘National Land Planning and Utilization Act’ (NLPUA), and replacing the existing ‘Utilization and Management of the National Territory or Urban Planning Act’.


In 2003, the government started to consider ways to mitigate golf course regulation as part of its effort to rationalise regulation aimed at stimulating tourism and the sports industry. The government abolished the regulation restricting the site areas for golf courses and ski resorts, and instead improved
the regulation by expanding preserved land by 20 percent to 25 percent for nature conservation. This measure was aimed at keeping more Korean overseas golf tourists in the country by increasing the number of domestic golf courses, lifting the restrictions on site areas for accommodation at golf courses in response to family-level tourism demand, and utilising land rationally in the case of local golf course construction, through the ‘Act on Special Cases Concerning the Regulation of the Special Economic Zones for Specialized Regional Development’ (RRC, 2003).

Golf course regulation was selected as a strategic project by the RRC in 2004. The RRC designed the purpose and strategy for improving construction-related regulations in order to stimulate local economies by creating employment, and to construct environmental-friendly golf courses by rationalising regulation and reducing the construction period and the costs. The government also implemented regulatory reform by dividing the work into four sectors: site/facility sector, licensing-procedure sector, regulatory transparency sector, and finance/taxation aid improvement sector (Lee et al., 2006).

With regard to the site/facility sector, a number of policy measures were implemented in terms of golf course construction/support within a large complex or a city, the removal of irrational restrictive regulations on golf course facilities, the improvement of areas and criteria for mountainous districts, the extension of construction areas to include vulnerable product-based or marginal farmland, and an extension into utilising seashore hill areas and idle landfills. For licensing procedures, the government paved the way for simplifying duplicate procedures, improving the environmental and traffic impact assessment system, minimising the number of required documents, and improving licence-related one-stop services.

Regulatory transparency minimised the discretionary influence of public officials by modifying the regulations that were not based on legislation and by reviewing the concerned legislation. The standard of advance environmental assessment was also legislated at the level of a lower statute, such as an enforcement ordinance or notification, so entrepreneurs can know the requirements in advance. The finance/taxation support sector improved the operation of local tax, the special consumption tax, and the Sport Promotion Fund in order to mitigate the burden on entrepreneurs and users.
Through such regulatory reform, in the case of one newly constructed golf course, it is estimated that private companies’ net benefits would increase by about ₩3.7 billion in licensing procedures for the business plan, by about ₩16 million in simplified negotiating procedures with the concerned agencies, by about ₩24 million in the environmental impact assessment system, and by about ₩4.6 million in the adjusted size of the targets of the traffic impact assessment.

However, the government-led mitigation of golf course regulation tended to cause reckless construction of golf courses, thus bringing about disputes due to lack of public consensus in advance. First, the restricting regulations over farmland conversion areas and over mountainous areas in the gross area were mitigated or abolished. In so doing, however, the increase in golf course construction around inexpensive and easy-to-purchase mountainous areas led to forest destruction and even to the destruction of ecologically protected areas. Following regulatory reform in 2004, the change in forest conversion areas surged threefold in 2005 and then by 4.5 times in 2006 compared with 2004. Consequently, the construction of golf courses in mountainous areas caused considerable forest destruction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.4. Changes in Forest Conversion Areas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Unit: m²)</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
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<td>Area</td>
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</table>


Second, public consensus with regard to mitigating golf course construction regulations was insufficient. The government estimated that mitigating regulations would lead to direct economic effects amounting to ₩27 trillion, helping to alleviate the economic recession. Civil society, however, pointed out that structural reforms needed to address the fundamental causes of the economic recession – households’ bad loans and a weak correlation between exports and domestic demand – and these should come first in the economic recovery. It also argued that economic revitalisation through golf course construction was likely to overheat the real estate business, causing adverse side effects and environmental pollution, outweighing the benefits of golf course construction (Kukminilbo, 2004). Whether or not in agricultural areas, some areas were proactive in soliciting golf course construction beneficial for local development (The Munhwa Ilbo, 2004), while other areas started movements to prevent construction (The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2004).
3.3. Regulatory Adjustment (after 2004)

The government made continuous efforts to address the problems caused by regulatory reform in 2003–2004. To begin with, the government attempted to complement site regulations for golf courses by improving four impact assessment systems, establishing the Business Difficulties Resolution Center, and evaluating the strategic projects on regulatory reform. Improving the four impact assessment systems led to well-written evaluation reports and reinforced the responsibility of assessment agents. The government also set up a standard model for the evaluation report by different business types – housing site, road, golf course, etc. – and distributed this to entrepreneurs to make a qualified impact assessment beyond a certain level.

Although golf course construction within water-supply source protection areas had been banned across the board, the Business Difficulties Resolution Center revised the standard for golf course locations to approve construction, when pollution could be reduced by the environmental impact assessment. Thus, these measures brought about positive results in golf course construction, avoiding pasture sites located within water-supply source protection areas. In assessing strategic projects, regulation of golf course construction was selected as one of the main strategic projects in the architectural/construction sector and subject to regulatory reform. As a result, the uniformly applied provisions, such as the size of the golf course, were abolished, and the process by which mayors or governors approved business licences was also omitted to speed up the administrative procedures (RRC, 2005).

In 2006, the main provisions, methods, and issues of advance environmental assessment were chosen through detailed evaluation of the newly established reinforcing regulations. The main provisions are supposed to consider geography, landscape, green belt, ecology, water quality conditions, and other local traits, and to complement the existing ‘Enforcement Decree of the IUSFA (Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act)’ and ‘Regulations Related to Standards of Sites and Conservation of Environment for Golf Course’.
### Table 4.5. Focus Areas of Advance Environmental Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Assessment Areas</th>
<th>Assessment Method and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical Features and Landscape</td>
<td>Make an assessment of whether excessive topographical changes would damage the landscape. Areas with a gradient of 25° (5m×5m), taking up more than 40 percent of the area where a golf course would be constructed. (Its suitability will be reviewed and decided according to business viability, but it should also consider local preservation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Belt and Ecology</td>
<td>Make an assessment of whether it includes areas indicating favourable ecological zoning. Areas with a good natural environment (e.g. areas with first-class ecological zoning in accordance with Article 34 of the ‘Natural Environment Conservation Act’). Areas where endangered wild animals and plants according to Article 2 of the ‘Wildlife Protection and Management Act’ inhabit the site where the proposed golf course would be constructed. (Such an area makes it a rule to be exempted.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Quality Condition</td>
<td>Reviewing whether an area has lost its environmental benefits because of damage to waterfront areas (e.g. streams and lakes) Areas that should be mainly assessed in golf course. Suitability should be assessed by considering pollutants caused by waste water and rainfall and of outflow water treatment measures. Areas within 300m of the full water level of an agricultural reservoir with available reservoir storage of more than 300,000m³ Areas within 300m of a national or local stream. Local streams are limited to local first-class streams with asterisk 1 according to the Enforcement Decree Of The River Act of a Presidential Decree No. 20722). Areas within 300m of a waterfront boundary designated by Article 4 of the ‘Act on the Improvement of Water Quality and Support for Residents of the Riverhead of the Han River System’, the ‘Act on Water Management and Residents Support in the Nakdong River Basin’, the ‘Act on Water Management and Resident Support in the Geum River Basin’, and the ‘Act on the Management of Water and Support of Residents in the Yeongsan and Seomjin River Basins’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Local Characteristics, etc.</td>
<td>Reviewing the suitability of golf course location considering other significant environmental impacts in addition to No. 1 or No. 3, or other local traits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A provision for ‘The Investigation on Used Amounts of Pesticide in Golf Courses and the Method to Inspect Pesticide Residue’ was legislated, according to which all golf courses in Korea should inspect and analyse the used amount of pesticides and pesticide residue twice a year – once in the first half and once in the second half of the year. The information provided has helped prevent environmental pollution by golf courses of the surrounding land, groundwater, and streams (Ministry of Environment [MOE] & National Institute of Environmental Research, 2015).

In 2008, the government improved regulations for locating and establishing golf courses by incorporating a process of regulatory improvement in the tourism/services sector, as well as the proposals for regulatory reform. In the process of regulatory improvement in the tourism/services sector, the government reinforced regulations on mountainous gradients in the environmental impact assessment by revising ‘Regulations Related to the Main Prior Environment Impact Assessment’s Review Items and Method’ and ‘Regulations Related to the Standard for Golf Courses and Environmental Preservation’. The total percentage of the secured forest site, as well as the total percentage of the golf course area in comparison with the forest area by province were abolished. The government also revised the ‘Directive on Land Property Assessment’ by gathering projects on regulatory reform, whereby the standards were mitigated and golf courses could be located within 300m–500m of the full water level of an agricultural reservoir.

3.4. The Outcomes of Regulatory Reform (since 2010)

Overall, regulatory reform of golf course regulations has been a success. The number of golf courses has increased, whereas the number of regulations concerning golf course sites has decreased. Environmental damage caused by golf courses has decreased considerably with the strengthening surveillance and supervision of environmental pollution.

The number of domestic golf courses increased tenfold over the past 3 decades, from 24 in 1983 to 248 in 2012. After the reform of golf course regulations was completed in 2003–2004, golf course construction increased much faster than in the period prior to regulatory reform, as is evident from an annual average 6 percent increase. Since demand for golf courses has still not been fully met, this
stronger annual increase may be the result of facilitating the autonomous entry of private companies and a high rate of return of up to 30 percent (Kim and Kim, 2011). It could be argued, therefore, that the government’s reform of site regulations has provided the institutional foundations for greater balance between supply and demand in the golf market.

Figure 4.8. Changes in the Numbers of Golf Course Users
(Unit: people, place)

Regulatory reform of golf course construction has been through a reduction of the total number of relevant regulations. In 2004, the number of regulations related to golf course construction was 251, including the majority of regulations for sites and procedures, and 69 main regulations. Through the process of regulatory reform, the government began to improve the 46 remaining regulations: 13 on sites/locations, 11 on facilities/operations, three on taxation/financial aid, and 19 on simplifying licensing procedures. In 2007, about 96 percent of the regulations out of a total of 46 target regulations had been improved: 38 regulations had been completed, 6 regulations were in process, and the remaining 2 regulations had been carried forward (Office for Government Policy Coordination [OGPC], 2007).

Clearly, consistent monitoring and surveillance of environmental pollution caused by golf course construction contributed to a reduction in the detection frequency of pesticide residue and reduced the number of cases where pesticides with high toxicity were used. In 2011, no pesticides were detected on golf courses in Gwangju (2), Kyeongsangbuk-do (44), Chuncheongnam-do (21), and Jeonranam-
do (31), although they accounted for 24 percent of the total golf courses in Korea and 21.6 percent of the total use of pesticides. On a national scale, the use of pesticides with high toxicity has not been reported since 2006, and the inspection results on pesticide residue in each golf course have also shown clean results, with the exception of 2010 (Kim et al., 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number of Target Regulations</th>
<th>Rate of Improvement (Proceeding, Completed Regulation, Regulation Target)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site Area Securing</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility/Operation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation/Fund Aid</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval Procedure Simplification</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prime Minister’s Office, 2007.

4. The Role of the Regulatory Management System

With regard to the regulations for golf courses in Korea, the wide variety of regulations, so-called ‘bundled regulation’, have had a complex impact on the construction and use of golf courses. Recognising problems with bundled regulation, the government significantly mitigated site regulations in the sectors of site/facility, licensing procedure, regulatory transparency, and finance/taxation aid through regulatory reform in 2004. These resulted in a higher rate of golf course construction than prior to regulatory reform. However, while the government’s uniformly implemented regulatory reform facilitated golf course construction, even in mountainous areas due to inexpensive land prices, it also caused environmental damage in mountainous areas.

To deal with the problems caused by deregulation, the government gave shape to the provisions that should be considered in the case of constructing golf courses through the notification from the MOE. As a result, the process of reforming the government’s regulation has changed into regulation of the balance between the benefits to entrepreneurs and to environmental protection.
As noted, the regulations for golf courses have constantly improved in Korea for the following reasons. Firstly, the RMS designated a period of regulatory reassessment to be implemented within 5 years, according to the FAAR, to ensure transparency and responsibility. Secondly, regulatory objectivity was ensured in the RIA by indicating existing objective research outcomes. Lastly, wide participation by stakeholders served as a window for garnering public opinion.

4.1. The Obligation for Regulatory Reassessment

The FAAR sets a time limit on regulations and reassessment of regulations to strengthen monitoring and reassessment of regulations. When establishing or strengthening regulations, the chief of a central administrative organ must set the regulation’s time limit and reassessment time limit, and stipulate them in legislation. A regulation’s time limit is supposed to be set at no more than 5 years.

Also, when it is necessary to extend the existing time limit or reassessment time limit, this must be approved in a preliminary review by the RRC. For instance, the provision of ‘The Investigation on Used Amounts of Pesticide in Golf Courses and the Method to Inspect Pesticide Residue’ was revised in 2009, 2011, and 2014 following its legislation in 2006. Through the revision process, decisions on the use of pesticides became clearer, and the use of pesticides on golf courses could be more easily identified. Through the reassessment time limit, changes to the legislation can be considered by abolishing or revising articles within the designated period.

4.2. Ensuring Objectivity through Regulatory Impact Assessment

Among various regulations relating to golf courses, the ‘Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Prior Environment Reviewing Methods of Golf Courses’ stipulated that the area with a gradient of 20°–30° should be less than 50 percent of the total area covered by the gold course construction. As the regulation was strengthened in 2006, the proportion of areas with gradients of 25° was reduced to below 30 percent, since constructing golf courses in mountainous areas not only damaged the environment but also threatened golf course safety. In this context, the government implemented the RIA based on assumptions for the
The government estimated the value of business-planned sites through the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) and calculated regulatory costs considering the rate immovable to advance environmental assessment from 2011 to 2014, and the annual golf course establishment plan. Given the overall costs and benefits, it was estimated that social net benefits would increase by about ₩6.6 billion. Thus, it could support its justification for the reinforced regulations with an objective analysis.

Table 4.7. Cost Benefit Analysis of Regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regulation Costs</th>
<th>Regulation Benefit</th>
<th>Social Benefits/Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>₩51 billion/991,735 m²</td>
<td>₩57.6 billion/991,735 m²</td>
<td>₩6.6 billion/991,735 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of Calculation</td>
<td>Costs that are not constructed by evaluation standard</td>
<td>18% of the property value of the first-class land per pyeong with ecological naturalness</td>
<td>Regulatory cost benefit–Regulatory cost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.3. Public Consultation Process for Stakeholders

The process of public consultation on regulations was instrumental in increasing transparency and responsibility, and reaping positive results in terms of increased compliance by the regulatory target groups (Choi, 2011). Article 9 of the FAAR stipulates the need for public consultation through various means when establishing or reinforcing regulations.

In the process of reforming golf course regulations, the government attempted to garner public opinion by setting up a Joint Private–Public Regulatory Reform Task Force, established and operated by the Business Difficulties Resolution Center. This collected public opinion by initiating public contests for people’s proposals regarding regulatory reform. In establishing the regulation prior to the notification of the advance environmental assessment of a golf course, opinions were collected from the departments concerned (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries), stakeholders concerned (golf industry, Korea Golf Course Business Association), and experts (architectural industry,

5. Evolution of the Regulatory Management System

The basic principles of Korea’s RMS were established in 1997 by FAAR. The issuance of regulations requires a legal basis and the most effective way is required to ensure objectivity, transparency, and fairness to realise the purpose of the regulations. This principle has continued until now, and legislating or amending golf course regulations is also based on such principles. Nonetheless, society has continuously requested for regulatory reform, either because complicated regulations have failed to fully reflect reality, or because regulations have negatively impacted individual activities.

Golf course regulatory reform has been one of the most representative regulatory processes undertaken. As the demand for golf increased, so the need for more golf courses grew, and the government attempted to carry out regulatory reform in accordance with public demand. However, due to environmental destruction caused by golf course construction, the government had to find a balance during the process of legislating/amending the relevant regulations. Despite the considerable time and costs incurred in legislating/amending site regulations in the early 2000s, Korea’s current regulatory reform is being implemented more effectively than it had been in the past.

In light of the regulatory policy cycle, regulatory objectivity and transparency have been achieved through a wide range of impact assessments aimed at legislating or amending regulations. This also helps to better understand bundled regulation through a regulatory map, while international agreements and regulatory levels in relation to other countries are also considered. In terms of policy support, the government has attempted to ensure regulatory compliance by varying the windows used to collect people’s opinions and proactively participating in advertising major policies. With regard to the regulatory agency’s monitoring and surveillance, a legal amendment procedure is in progress to strengthen the status of the RRC, which handles domestic regulations.
5.1 Regulatory Policy Cycle

In light of the regulatory policy cycle, the reform of golf course regulations in 2003 has evolved into a far more objective and transparent regulatory policy. It has implemented various types of RIA that directly impact on the improvement of golf course regulations, and has continuously improved legislating/amending regulations to reflect international agreements, such as those of the World Trade Organization and free trade agreements, through a regulatory map to promote easier recognition of bundled regulation.

First, in dealing with a certain regulation, the Korean government makes an in-depth evaluation from various perspectives based on RIAs, the Technology–Regulation Impact Assessment, the Small-Business Impact Assessment, and the Competitive Impact Assessment. Also, the government attempts to conduct a more professional RIA by implementing a RIA on detailed parts of technology regulation, small business, and fair competition. Such a RIA ensures specialty by establishing and operating the ‘Technical Regulatory Reform Task Force’, the ‘Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Regulatory Reform Task Force’, and the ‘Fair Competition Regulatory Reform Task Force’ in accordance with the ministry responsible for regulations and with each regulatory sector.²

Second, complementing the existing regulatory registration system, the government has created a regulatory map in an attempt to help the regulatory target group to better understand bundled regulation consisting of complicated procedures. The main function of a regulatory map is to easily recognise the whole regulatory process by schematising the regulatory system, process, and relevant documents with regard to a certain sector. After total inspection of the relevant regulations and regulation categorising, the final draft is completed through a process of mutual relationship analysis, flow charts, and diagramming. This process reduces regulatory costs by helping the regulatory target group with its understanding of the regulatory procedures and provides an opportunity to assess whether there are duplicate or unnecessary regulations (RRC, 2007).

² ‘Regulations Related to Establishment and Operation for Regulatory Reform Task Force for Field-Based Regulatory Reform Operation’.
Third, Korea has established and amended regulations in consideration of World Trade Organization agreements and free trade agreements to correspond to global standards. These agreements aim to minimise unnecessary trade barriers in pursuit of free trade among member states. Barriers should not be added in legislated or amended regulations unless absolutely necessary, such as related to the environment, security, and public health. For these reasons, the government has attempted to comply with the agreements by adding the process to assess whether regulations, legislated or amended in the process of the RIA, impede free trade. This is another way of ensuring regulatory transparency, as it helps other member states to better understand the domestic regulatory status and prevents discriminatory treatment.

5.2. Supporting Policy Practices

In accordance with the development of data communication technology, the practice of supporting government policies has gradually expanded. Public consultations vary and PR via SNS (Social Networking Service) has narrowed the distance between the government and the people. First, the windows for garnering public opinion have become more diverse. In 2003, the government set up the Joint Public–Private Regulatory Reform Task Force, established and operated by the Business Difficulties Resolution Center, in an attempt to garner public opinion by initiating public contests for people’s proposals regarding regulatory reform.

In 2014, the government communicated with people through various channels: interview websites (Regulatory Reform Sinmungo in Regulatory Information Portal), ministries’ official websites, SNS, etc. People’s opinions concerning regulatory reform, proposed in Regulatory Reform Sinmungo, are transferred to the regulation-related department, where it is decided whether or not to accept them. Clarifying the process increases transparency and people’s satisfaction. As of February 2015, the number of opinions registered in Regulatory Reform Sinmungo totalled 22,732; 9,942 opinions had been replied to and 269 opinions were under review/discussion.

The government also conveys policy information via mobile messenger programmes such as Kakao Talk and MyPeople. Since individual users choose whether they wish to receive the information, it carries a greater power of
delivery compared with newspapers or the mass media, which target unspecified individuals. Using SNS, Twitter, and Facebook as the main means of communicating with people has paved the way for providing prompt feedback regarding government policies and increasing policy advertising.

5.3. Supporting Institutions

In 2014, the ‘Legislative Bill of Regulatory Reform Act’ was proposed in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. Although FAAR had been gradually revising the legislative bill, this was proposed on account of its failure to reflect the changing regulatory environment (Kim, 2014). The proposal included ways to legislate ‘cost-in, cost-out’ and to strengthen the functions of the RRC.

Since its establishment in 1998, the RRC has carried out reviews and mediation of regulatory policies, as well as the evaluation and organisation of regulation (OGPC, 2015). Prior to investment, the government attempted to authorise the RRC to promote reform more effectively with powers of inspection of duties and submission of opinions for institutional improvements over the President, National Assembly, and local governments through the Special Act on Regulatory Reform (Moon, 2014).

6. Conclusion

The government’s regulatory reform can be initiated for several reasons. In some cases it is in response to requests from people who feel inconvenienced in their economic and social activities by a certain regulatory policy; in other cases it is to transform the existing regulatory system for more successful implementation of a certain policy. It seems that the reform of golf course regulation was initiated by a combination of the two, as mentioned above. In other words, demand for golf courses had increased significantly with the rising popularity of golf, and so the government mitigated golf course regulations based on its policy objectives of stimulating the economy and reducing the number of Korean golfers becoming overseas golf tourists. Despite this, regulatory reform focused only on revitalising golf and created other problems.
As burdensome site regulations were mitigated, many entrepreneurs seized the opportunity to construct golf courses, helping achieve the policy objectives of increasing the number of golf courses and users. However, some golf courses that were constructed in mountainous areas because of cheaper land have caused widespread environmental damage, while agricultural pesticides used to protect grass on golf courses have caused environmental pollution in neighbouring areas. In an attempt to address such side effects, the government suggested regulatory improvements in the form of existing regulatory reform.

Due to regulatory reform aimed at preventing reckless environmental damage, the regulations were improved in a far more objective and scientific way than would have been possible under previous regulatory reform. Compared with regulatory reform initiated in 2004, the government’s regulatory improvements tended to reinforce existing regulations. In aiming to increase the number of golf courses and users, however, the Golf Promotion Policy contributed not only to achieving this policy objective but also to reducing environmental damage and pollution through regulatory improvements.

The success of regulatory reform in Korea lies in having regular periods for regulatory assessments within the RMS; in predicting more objective and rational regulatory impacts via the RIA; and in ensuring regulatory compliance, as well as transparency, by gathering the opinions of concerned experts and stakeholders. The current RMS has been strengthened with more specialisation than the RMS of 2003, and improved in such a way as to establish more transparent procedures.

The regulatory policy cycle system has adopted guidelines for the RIA based on its subdivision into professional fields, laying out procedures for bundled regulation using a regulatory map, and international agreements. Policy support has raised effectiveness of policy advertising by garnering public opinion in various ways and utilising SNS or Social Networking Service for proactive communication with stakeholders. It should also be noted that strengthening the RRC would pave the way for far more effective regulatory reform.

Through a public consultation process with various groups, the RMS has contributed to reduced uncertainties caused by regulatory enforcement, reduced social costs, and greater regulatory compliance of the regulatory target groups. It thus appears that continual development of the RMS, reflecting social
requirements and changes in the political environment, is the best way to ensure successful regulatory reform.

In the following case, we explore the reform of opening hours of food services businesses. This case shows the central role of the RMS in initiating and institutionalising reform and in harmonising political leadership and public backing in support of reform coherence and performance. It also shows how market competition is fostered and civilian autonomy encouraged.

Part 3: The Case of the Reform of Opening Hours of Food Services Businesses in Korea

1. Introduction: Reform of Opening Hours of Food Services Businesses

Before the regulatory reform of 1998, food service businesses had been required to obtain permits from government authorities with details concerning the condition of premises, the facilities, the number of employees, sanitation, etc. Obtaining a permit was a lengthy process partly because the authorities had to confirm whether the standards in the business facilities were adequate. Failure to uphold standards resulted in complaints to the authorities and complaints were also made after the issuance of permits, as businesses were under strict regulation by local government officials and the police to protect social safety and juveniles against the abuse of alcohol and violent crime. Except for Jeju Island and seaport cities, opening hours were restricted to midnight, and those breaking the rules faced severe penalties in most metropolitan cities (RRC, 1999). In essence, the opening hours of food service businesses were restricted by metropolitan mayors/provincial (Do) governors based on regional circumstances, as shown in Table 4.8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opening Hours</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Until 24:00</td>
<td>Seoul, Daegu, Guangju, etc. – 11 City/Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Until 02:00</td>
<td>Busan, Incheon, etc. – 4 City/Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No limitation</td>
<td>Jeju (Special area for tourism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#Part 3 is authored by Dae Yong Choi.
Food services businesses are categorised as follows:

- **Rest restaurant businesses**: Cooking and sale of mainly tea, ice cream, etc., or cooking and sale of food in fast-food stores or snack bars, where alcoholic drinks are not allowed
- **General restaurant business**: Cooking and sale of food, where alcoholic drinks are allowed
- **Karaoke bar business**: Cooking and sale of mainly alcoholic beverages, where customers are allowed to sing
- **Entertainment bar business**: Cooking and sale of mainly alcoholic beverages, where workers engaged in entertainment may be employed, or entertainment facilities may be established, and customers are allowed to sing or dance.

The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC), established in April 1998, launched far-reaching reforms of existing regulations by setting reform guidelines abolishing anti-competitive practices and encouraging civilian autonomy. According to these reform guidelines, ministries drew up plans to clear existing regulations. And the RRC directly tackled policy regulations that had normally been regarded as being in the hands of administrative bureaucrats. The regulation of opening hours of food services businesses was among these regulations.

The emphasis of the RRC reform was on encouraging business activities based on market competition and civilian autonomy. The aim was to transition towards demand-oriented regulation instead of supply-oriented regulation. Many restaurant owners complained about the strict enforcement of regulations and police raids, which gave rise to the practice of bribing enforcement officials. Differences in opening hours by region were also regarded as unfair (RRC, 1999). The restriction on the opening hours of restaurants up to midnight in metropolitan cities caused inconvenience to people, particularly night workers and tourists. Fairness was also an issue due to the differences in opening hour restrictions between different tourist zones, tourist hotels, and City/Do industries. Excessive police and administrative enforcement was used to regulate opening hours. The RRC had announced the start of regulatory reform of food service businesses by abolishing the restrictions on opening hours in May 1998.

Although the reform met with strong opposition and resistance, it abolished restrictions and changed the licensing system for food service businesses from a strict permit system to a more flexible report system.
2. Impetus for the Change of Opening Hours of Food Services Businesses

The RRC played a vital role in reforming business rules and regulations that restricted or hindered economic activities and civilian autonomy. Outdated and excessive regulations were eliminated under the regulatory reform programme. Food service businesses welcomed the reform scheme to abolish restrictions on opening hours, as it enabled them to boost their profits by extending opening hours. Local governments also welcomed the reform scheme because it removed troublesome work to impose the previous regulations and it eliminated a source of corruption for enforcement officials.

But civic organisations such as women’s organisations, religious organisations, and consumer groups claimed that the restrictions on opening hours of food service businesses were necessary and that opening hours should not be liberalised because of possible social harm and damage. They were especially concerned about the liberalisation of entertainment bars’ opening hours. They insisted that such liberalisation would lead to a surge in the number of bars, which in turn would lead to rampant overconsumption of alcohol and a bad environment for young people.

Initially, with criticism against the RRC’s scheme mounting, the President passively supported the RRC by remaining silent on the issue. The debate was fuelled by media attention and the proposed reform scheme became the subject of heated and emotional exchanges. Reactions to the reform scheme from women’s, consumer, and environmental groups were highly emotional, as the move was deemed to lead to a decay of social health and moral values. These groups argued that if restrictions were abolished, men would drink all night and juvenile delinquency would rise.

Despite fierce opposition, the RRC continued to push forward with the reform and tried to persuade opposition groups by increasing public awareness. The RRC and the government actively and continuously briefed the public on the rationale behind the reform and its positive effects, and consistently entered into dialogue with opposing groups. After two months of public consultations, an agreement was reached and the reform proposal was endorsed by opposition groups. These opposition groups accepted complementary action to strengthen social protection from the detrimental effects of greater numbers of entertainment bars.
Given the concerns of opposition groups over entertainment bars, the RRC arranged supplementary measures to strengthen juvenile protection. Civic organisations argued that the RRC’s stance was based on a strongly pro-business approach and that there should be representatives from civic groups in the RRC to ensure social safety and consumer protection. As a result, the RRC agreed to invite representatives of civic groups as members.

Open dialogue and discussions in public hearings, continuous persuasion by the RRC, and its step-by-step approach to deregulation ultimately led to a lifting of the restrictions on opening hours of food services businesses. The opening hours of rest and general restaurants were liberalised from 15 September 1998, and those of karaoke and entertainment bars from 1 March 1999. General deregulation for start-ups in the food services businesses was changed from a strict permit system to a more flexible report system. In addition, the processing period of the licensing system was reduced from 3 to 5 days, with a permit immediately obtainable on receipt of an application, and ex post if official confirmation was needed. The results of the reform are summarised in Table 4.9.

Three forces came together to create the impetus for reform of opening hour restrictions on food services businesses:

- external pressure for reform triggered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997,
- an institutional framework for regulatory reform was in place, and
- internal organisational dynamics created pressure for reform.

Table 4.9. Reform of Opening Hour Restrictions on Food Services Businesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Before 1998</th>
<th>What Changed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on opening hours</td>
<td>Until 24:00h in Seoul, Daegu, etc. – 11 City /Do</td>
<td>No restriction on rest and general restaurants from September 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Until 02:00h in Busan, Incheon, etc. – 4 City/Do</td>
<td>No restriction on karaoke and entertainment bars from March 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No limitation in Jeju</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot raids by enforcement</td>
<td>Strict enforcement and penalty</td>
<td>No spot raids by officials on opening hours according to the above periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>officials and police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start-up restaurants</td>
<td>Strict ex ante permit system with confirmation by local authorities</td>
<td>Report system with ex post complement by confirmation from November 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing period</td>
<td>3–5 days</td>
<td>Immediate permit from November 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1. External Pressure for Reform (Asian Financial Crisis of 1997)

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 provided a strong motive for undertaking reform of the existing regulations to overcome the crisis. It triggered the radical reform of the entire regulatory system, with the government intervening in the private sector to encourage greater market competition and civilian autonomy. This general consensus between the government and the general public for strong reform was possible due to a shared desire to overcome the impact of the economic crisis.

2.2. Institutional Arrangements for Regulatory Reform Had Been Prepared Before the Crisis

Korea started to conduct administrative reform and deregulation in the 1980s to address demand for reform arising from a government-led development strategy. The reforms undertaken suffered from some limitations, such as a weak legal basis for institutional arrangements and longer-term sustainability, its ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or advisory role. Having learned the lessons of this reform experience, the government enacted the FAAR in 1997 to provide a systematically sound and sustainable legal basis for regulatory reform. The major contents of the FAAR are as follows:

- establishing the RRC as a central reform driver and oversight body with a majority of civilian members, led by the Prime Minister and a civilian co-chair;
- introducing regulatory managerial tools, such as regulatory reviews, regulatory impact analysis, registration and publication, etc.; and
- monitoring and evaluating the impacts of regulatory reform work.

Although enacted in 1997, the FAAR was enforced only from 1998 onwards.

2.3. Internal Organisational Dynamics that Created Pressure for Reform

In April 1998, the government established the RRC and launched drastic regulatory reform based on the FAAR to overcome the impact of the economic crisis. The RRC set the reform guidelines for existing regulations and announced some critical reform agendas, such as abolishing restrictions on the opening
hours of food service businesses to encourage market competition and civilian autonomy. Each ministry was required to submit its draft reform plan to the RRC, which was then reviewed and the reform objectives agreed upon.

Regarding the reform of opening hour restrictions, the relevant ministries and agencies were not in opposition. The internal interactions and coordination between the RRC and the ministries and agencies were well managed in accordance with the policy process. However, civic organisations did oppose the reform and strongly resisted the reform agenda, citing the need to protect social values and juveniles. The RRC, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), and government ministries held public consultations and raised levels of awareness of the reform and continued to hold dialogue with groups opposed to the reform. As a result, continuous persuasion by the RRC and its step-by-step approach to deregulation ultimately led to the removal of restrictions on opening hours of food service businesses. The opening hours were liberalised in a step-by-step approach from September 1998. The Ministry of Welfare in charge of implementing the restriction took action by revising the relevant decrees.

3. The Sequence of Events

The reform measures proceeded in eight phases in the following sequence:

- establishing the RRC in April 1998;
- giving reform guidelines by the RRC to ministries in May 1998;
- announcing the reform initiative on opening hour restrictions by the RRC in May 1998;
- conducting public consultations and raising awareness by the RRC with relevant agencies and opposition groups, from May to July 1998;
- conducting discussions for decision-making at RRC meetings, with the Ministry of Welfare proposing to change the permit system for food services businesses to a report system between August to September 1998;
- taking the policy process for implementation to the State Council meeting in September 1998;
- enforcing no restrictions on opening hours on rest and general restaurants by revising the Ministerial Notification in September 1998;
• enforcing no restrictions on opening hours on karaoke and entertainment bars by revising the Ministerial Decree in March 1999; and
• enforcing a report system of food services businesses by revising the Presidential Decree in November 1999.

**Figure 4.9. Timeline for the Reform of Opening Hours**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>August – FAAR enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>April – RRC established, Reform guidelines and agendas were set. May – Consultation and persuasion with opposition. May/July – Discussion and decision-making at RRC and State Council. July/August – First part of liberalisation was enforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>September – Second part of liberalisation was enforced. November – Deregulation on food service businesses was enforced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FAAR = Framework Act on Administrative Regulations; RRC = Presidential Regulatory Reform Committee.

### 3.1. Institution Building and the Reform Drive (late 1997–April 1998)

The FAAR was enacted to provide legislative authority for stable regulatory reform in August 1997, which resulted from accumulated reform experience and lessons learnt from the limitations of temporary and advisory reform. The FAAR firmly guaranteed the private sector’s involvement and civilian majority rule in comprising the RRC as a reform driver. Coincidentally, the institutional arrangements were coming into force at the critical time of the Asian financial crisis, which provided a strong motive for later enforcement to overcome the impact of the subsequent economic crisis in 1998.

The first step was to set up the RRC composed of a majority of civilian members and government ministers, co-chaired by the Prime Minister and a civilian. The RRC played a central role in leading the reform drive by setting reform guidelines and agendas. The core principle was to encourage market competition and civilian autonomy by clearing away existing regulations. The RRC took the
initiative of reforming opening hour restrictions on food services businesses by launching its regulatory reform in May 1998. The reform agenda was raised on the grounds that opening hour restrictions restrained business activities in the private sector to an excessive degree relative to the standards of a market economy and general behaviour. Complaints from such businesses had already been expressed because of the inconvenience to customers and perceived unfair differences between regions.


The reform plan was welcomed by both relevant businesses and local governments, with the latter no longer required to undertake site raids and impose penalties. However, civic groups such as women’s organisations, religious organisations, and consumer groups claimed that the restrictions on opening hours of food services businesses were necessary to minimise social harm and damage. These groups were especially concerned about the liberalisation of the opening hours of entertainment bars. They insisted this would increase the number of bars and lead to rampant overconsumption of alcohol, and create an environment detrimental to young people.

Despite fierce opposition, the RRC together with relevant ministries and agencies continued to push ahead with the reform and tried to persuade opposition groups by increasing public awareness of the reform. The RRC and the government continuously briefed the public on the rationale and positive impacts of the reform and dialogued with opposition groups to reach an understanding. Finally, after 2 months of public consultations an agreement was reached and the reform proposal was endorsed by opposition groups, which accepted complementary action to strengthen social protection from entertainment bars.

Once the public consultations had succeeded in reaching agreement with opposing groups, formal discussions and a decision-making process quickly followed in the policy process. The Ministry of Public Health and Welfare drafted a reform plan to clear away existing regulations. The draft was finalised at the RRC and was presented at the meetings of the Vice Ministers and the State Council, composed of Cabinet ministers, for a formal decision by the executive. The relevant ministry took the required action to follow through the policy process, including the revision of laws for implementation, such as the reform of
the licensing system for food service businesses, into a report system with reduced administrative formalities.

3.3. Policy Implementation and Enforcement (September 1998–November 1999)

Implementation of the liberalisation of opening hours of food services businesses was carried out step-by-step according to the strength of social values, beginning with rest and general restaurants and moving on to karaoke and entertainment bars. To protect social values, and especially juveniles, complementary action such as police patrolling, monitoring, and preventative actions against urban crime and violations were significantly reinforced by the relevant agencies. Rapid decision-making and implementation were possible because of the reform consensus between the government and the private sector to overcome the impact of the economic crisis by taking radical action through regulatory reform. Strong leadership on reform with public support made it possible to take prompt and dramatic action.

4. The Role of the Regulatory Management System

The RMS was set up with the implementation of the FAAR in 1998, together with the establishment of the RRC. The reform of restrictions on opening hours was one example of the abolition of existing regulations under the RRC’s initiative to encourage increased market competition and civilian autonomy. The RRC played a central role in pushing ministries to cut existing regulations by half. This reform work involved a major policy to review the entire regime of regulations, including the revision of related and subordinate rules. While the lifting of opening hour restrictions on food services was done by revising decrees, the reform work was part of a major policy to change the entire regulatory regime.

The RRC, as the core part of the RMS, took a central role in reforming the opening hours of food service businesses, together with handling opposition groups. This essentially moved into the stage of public consultations and communication in support of the reform initiative. The RRC and the PMO were heavily involved in coordinating and persuading opposition groups, including raising awareness among the wider general public.
The RMS provided a strong platform for enhancing accountability and transparency by changing regulations, as shown in this case study. The RRC endorsed accountability and transparency by setting out reform guidelines and proposals for the regulatory agencies. The response of the regulatory agencies to the liberalisation of opening hour restrictions initially was reluctant because of opposition from civic groups and a reduction in regulatory influence. However, the RRC took pre-emptive action by setting out the reform guidelines and announcing the reform plan to the public, making the reform both accountable and transparent. This emboldened both those inside and outside government, making them more zealous in dealing with opposition to the reform.

The case of reform on opening hour restrictions highlighted the positive role of the RMS in terms of its impact on the policy cycle, policy practices, and the promotion of increased market competition and civilian autonomy. This was achieved by using normative logic, as opposed to a more analytical approach based on cost–benefit analysis (CBA), in the initial stages of establishing the RMS. The RMS was meant to reform regulatory policy and implementation, both institutionally and substantively, reflecting the fact that there was a pathway from administrative reform to regulatory reform in Korea.

The institutional arrangements for the RMS were designed to facilitate regulatory reform linked to the policy process. In other words, if there were no RMS, such reform would not occur. Or if a reform were undertaken, it would take much longer to reach agreement between the government, stakeholders, and civic groups.

- Conducting drastic reform on existing regulations coupled with crisis management;
- Institutionalising regulatory reform with public–private partnerships in a civilian majority composition;
- Launching regulatory reform systematically and comprehensively; and
- Harmonising political leadership with public support to achieve reform coherence and performance.

The results of reform were estimated in various ways. One factor was the effect of deregulation on the market, as seen in Table 4.10. The total number of food service businesses and their rate of increase from 1997 to 2000 is shown in Table...
4.10. In addition, the wide variety of restaurants and branded coffee shops in Seoul has only occurred since the liberalisation of the industry in recent years, and can be seen as one of the fruits of regulatory reform.

Table 4.10. Change in the Number of Food Services Businesses in the Republic of Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Food Business</td>
<td>550,526</td>
<td>543,030</td>
<td>564,686</td>
<td>570,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Increase rate, %)</td>
<td>(-1.4)</td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5. What Difference Could An Enhanced RMS Have Made?

With respect to the reform of opening hours, the RMS played a central role not just in initiating policy change but also in supporting policy practices and the reform process. Although there was no CBA, the reform was supportive in advocating increased market competition and civilian autonomy. By linking the RMS with the Prime Minister as co-chair, and served by the PMO, the RMS could play an oversight role of ministries in conducting regulatory reform. It could also support policy development in the process of drafting reform proposals, consultations, discussions, and coordination of decision-making at State Council meetings.

In terms of the hypothetical question: ‘What role could an enhanced RMS have played in the case of opening hours regulation?’, if the case had been subject to the current RMS, would the outcome have been very different? It is necessary to consider what elements of the problem were foreseeable in advance and which were not. Korea has also introduced measures targeted at improving regulatory policy development and strengthening its institutions to make its regulatory system more effective and bring it in line with other OECD countries. The key components are as follows:

- a quality policy cycle,
- supporting policy practices (such as consultation), and
- capable oversight institutions.
5.1. The Regulatory Policy Cycle

There are two important managerial tools to apply to this case: the role of the RIA in the review of new regulations, and the role of stock management to keep regulatory regimes under review. Regarding the RIA, this seems to have an important impact in terms of identifying the costs and benefits of reform proposals. Subsequently, discussions concerning reform options can be based on coherent issues between stakeholders and the RRC. The same effect also applies to stock management of regulations by the RMS in checking the flow and stock of regulations to reduce regulatory burdens and costs in general.

5.2. Supporting Practices

Policy development for regulatory management includes the following supporting policy practices:

- consultation,
- communication and engagement,
- accountability and transparency, and
- learning.

The liberalisation of opening hours was aimed at encouraging greater market competition and civilian autonomy in response to demand from the food services sector concerning strict administrative controls and frequent intervention. This demand for reform from a regulated sector would be easily channelled under the current RMS. However, the case of reform in 1998 was initiated because of a strong administrative influence at that time. The RRC set the reform guidelines and pushed the regulatory agencies to reform. In line with this policy orientation, the RRC and the PMO were directly involved in consultations, communication, and engagement, while shouldering accountability for the feasibility of the reform.

The case of opening hours included challenging issues, such as handling the opposition of civic groups intermingled with the discussion of social values. Government agencies superior to the regulatory agencies played a critical role in dealing with these opposition groups. A more focused approach would be to make reform possible under the auspices of political leadership. Administrative implementation capacity could be better engaged in reform efforts and help deal with obstacles to reform at the critical time. Without the imperatives driven by
the economic crisis at that time, this approach to reform would not have been workable. In other words, it would not necessarily be possible under the current RMS because of the interest group politics that prevail. If there is serious rivalry and confrontation between interest groups, then the reform agenda could be in stalemate. An enhanced RMS would provide a sound basis for consultation, transparency, and accountability between stakeholders, including regulators. There is still a gap in applying RIA to existing regulations, which is required in reviewing new regulations or strengthening existing regulations.

5.3. Oversight Institutions

Korea has sound institutional arrangements in which the RRC and the PMO monitor and evaluate regulatory matters through the functions of regulatory review and registration. All central agencies follow the compulsory review process in making or changing regulations. The PMO, in administrative terms, plays a central role in leading ministries’ regulatory management by monitoring and evaluating performance, with the RRC served by the PMO. The PMO’s oversight role on regulatory management is combined with its function of policy evaluation over central ministries. On regulatory management, central ministries are closely linked with the RRC and the PMO. Local governments have their own jurisdiction over regulatory management, although regulations relating to delegated affairs are under the management of central line ministries. Local governments are encouraged to adopt the RMS in line with the central government and their performance is evaluated by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs. Although this oversight institution works well with the executive branch, closer cooperation on the RMS with the legislative branch is called for.

6. Conclusion

The case of the reform of opening hours was the product of regulatory reform to abolish existing regulations aimed at encouraging increased market competition and civilian autonomy. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent economic crisis triggered regulatory reform, the use of which had been prepared in advance by enacting the FAAR setting up the institutional framework. This simultaneously established the RMS with the enactment of the FAAR in 1998. The RRC, as a core component of the RMS, played a central role in conducting
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Cycle Elements</th>
<th>National RMS tool</th>
<th>Significance of Impact</th>
<th>Where could a requisite system have made a difference?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Policy</td>
<td>Reform on existing regulations</td>
<td>Very significant</td>
<td>Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor and legal policy</td>
<td>Revising decrees</td>
<td>Very significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making support</td>
<td>RRC</td>
<td>Very significant reform – hard work for persuading the opposing groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change implementation</td>
<td>Revising decrees</td>
<td>Very significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Very significant – change of enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and review</td>
<td>Stock stewardship</td>
<td>No significance – allowing the autonomy by deregulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting policy practices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation communication and engagement</td>
<td>RRC and Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)</td>
<td>Very significant – wide ranging consultation and engagement</td>
<td>PMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant – lack of on-the-ground learning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability and transparency</td>
<td>Public law</td>
<td>Significant – strong accountability and transparency requirements in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory policy principles</td>
<td>Principles and policy in place</td>
<td>Very significant – mood of the times was for regulatory reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead institution</td>
<td>RRC, PMO, and Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW)</td>
<td>Very significant – RRC played a leading role</td>
<td>MHW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating institutions and training providers</td>
<td>RRC, PMO, and MHW</td>
<td>Very significant – RRC played a coordinating role</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

regulatory reform by setting guidelines for the review of ministries’ reform plans. The RRC proposed the reform on opening hours of food service businesses, was directly involved in dealing with opposition groups, and completed the reform
through to implementation. It enhanced reform performance by switching from a strict permit system for food service businesses to a more flexible report system. The RMS contributed to establishing regulatory reviews, the RIA, a regulatory register, and publication of regulations, although no RIA was applied to the reform of opening hours as the initial stages of regulatory reform focused on abolishing unnecessary and obsolete regulations.

Summary Comment

Since the economic crisis of the late 1990s, the Government of the Republic of Korea has sought to strengthen the RMS to improve the quality of regulation and reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens. This chapter has explored the evolution of Korea’s regulation as the RMS has sought to eliminate outmoded and excessive regulations and establish a comprehensive and systematic mechanism to effectively review and manage new regulations.

Part 1 of this chapter explored the evolution of regulatory reform and the coherence of the RMS in Korea. It outlined a range of government initiatives that sought to increase coherence and efficiency. The authors found that (i) the government successfully strengthened policy focus and garnered public support; (ii) the central administration was better at registering regulation than local administrations, making regulatory reform incomplete and inefficient at the local level; and (iii) the massive deregulation responded effectively to the economic crisis within a relatively short period.

Part 2 examined how this system was applied to the reform of golf course regulation. This case illustrated that iterative reform responded effectively to both the original policy problem and the unintended consequences of policy responses. In this case, golf course regulation was responsive to environmental needs, as well as industry demands and the government’s attempt to transform existing policy.

Part 3 considered the reform of the opening hours of food services businesses. This reform sought to abolish the restrictions on opening hours of these businesses and move from a strict permit system to a report system for licensing. This case illustrates the central role of the RMS in initiating and institutionalising
reform and harmonising political leadership and public support to sustain reform coherence and performance. This case shows successful encouragement of market competition and civilian autonomy, as demonstrated by the increase in the total number of businesses in the post-crisis period from 1997 to 2000.

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